

**SOME ASPECTS
OF
INDIA'S MILITARY DEFENCE**



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
SOME ASPECTS OF INDIA'S MILITARY DEFENCE

BY

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE.
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARMY ..	10
III. DEFENCE ORGANISATION IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES	30
IV. THE SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM ..	40
V. CAPITATION AND NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGES	50
VI. RECRUITING	66
VII. INDIANISATION	93
VIII. THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE INDIAN STATES' FORCES ..	120
IX. ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY ..	129
X. THE PROBLEM OF RETRENCHMENT	149
INDEX	169
BIBLIOGRAPHY	173



FOREWORD

Mr. Limaye's thesis on "Some Aspects of India's Military Expenditure" was prepared by him for his M.A. degree and the Bombay University has given him a grant towards its publication.

Owing to the general world situation and the discussion relating to Constitutional advance in India, there has been in recent years a keen interest in problems relating to the defence of India. The present study is therefore opportune.

The subject raises issues of first rate importance to India like Indianisation of the Army, the building up of a force in which all parts of India will be adequately represented, the reduction of the military expenditure and an equitable allocation of charges between the Home exchequer and the Indian revenues. Mr. Limaye has dealt with all these topics in the light of blue books and other publications and set out his conclusions clearly. I feel confident that the thesis will be found useful by all students of the problems connected with the defence of India.

'Dilaram.'

Baroda.

18th October, 1938,

V. T. KRISHNAMACHARI,



PREFACE

The problem of India's Defence is both important as well as interesting. The present attempt to discuss some of the more salient features of this problem was begun some ten years ago. The material available is vast and wide. I fully realise my shortcomings, and difficulties. All the same, the present attempt is but the beginning of a new era in which the nationals of this country would be more and more interested in this all-pervading subject.


I feel very much indebted to His Excellency Sir V. T. Krishnamachari, the Dewan of Baroda, for his kind encouragement in readily responding to my humble request for a Foreword to this book.

I also acknowledge my indebtedness to the University of Bombay for the substantial financial help it has granted towards the cost of publication of this book.

I feel grateful to Prof. C. N. Vakil, University Professor of Economics, Bombay, for the kind and ready guidance throughout the preparation of this work, and also to Prof. P. A. Wadia of the Wilson College, Bombay.

Baroda College,
Baroda,
1st. February, 1939.

D. H. LIMAYE.



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The unheard-of trade depression is hitting hard almost all countries of the world, and India is no exception to it. With Millions of unemployed, India finds herself face to face with many difficulties peculiar to her. The cry against a top-heavy administration is being raised since the days of the late Hon. G. K. Gokhale. The fact that this complaint is more than justified, even to this day, is clearly proved by the appointment of various committees and commissions, during last so many years of which the Welby Commission of 1897 and the Inchcape Committee of 1923 are but the outstanding instances.

The world-wide trade depression through which we are passing even at the present moment, has synchronised with the politico-economic unrest in this country of ours with the result that the Government of India had to think very seriously about cutting down expenditure on various departments. The Central Retrenchment (Advisory) Committee of 1933 has pointed out various ways and means by which Indian Military Expenditure may be cut down by about Rs. 4 crores or more.

Very few indeed, have so far ventured authoritatively on matters relating to economy in this branch of Public Expenditure. An attempt is made to carry on some spade work in this so-called *reserved* subject, though we admit we are freshers. The Defence Estimates' Vote is non-votable, and as such

very scanty information is available for the general public. It is, no doubt, for the experts in the line, to say what is and is not desirable and also how far retrenchment can be carried out, bearing in mind the best interests of the country. The subject is entirely new, but to us in India, the importance of a subject such as this, is particularly so, in view of the fact that it means a question of nearly 50-60 crores of rupees every year or a total of about 40-50 per cent of the total revenues of the Government of India.

Military Finance is a branch of National Finance, and as such almost all its canons are applicable to Military Finance. In National Finance, the authorities adjust their income to the expenditure, unlike the individual who adjusts his expenditure according to his income.

However eloquent speeches the politicians and the statesmen of the world may make, everybody is convinced that as long as human nature remains unchanged, wars are inevitable. The civilised nations of the world now profess a desire for universal peace, but it is only a dream; and the professions of the respective national leaders are either a picturesque rhetoric of visionaries or a cloak for ulterior motives of self-interest and self-seeking.*

A Disarmament Conference implies that there probably will be another war and the business of the Conference is that of arriving at an understanding which will lessen the strain now endeavoured by civilised nations keeping themselves prepared for the

* *Army Quarterly*, April 1926.

inevitable—WAR. The armed forces in the world, hence, would remain with us for some time to come.

It may be asked at this stage, what is the propriety of such armed forces at all? Sir Frederic Sykes, ex-Governor of Bombay, and an ex-Under Secretary of State for Air in Great Britain, writing on the subject of reduction of armaments observes,* "The armaments of any nation depend materially upon those of its possible enemies, and the equivalent of a reduction in the armed forces of one country should be assessable in those of another". This, in short, means that as long as even a single nation in the world maintains armed forces, all the rest must follow suit. Hence reduction must be either universal or not at all.

If we see the budgets of some of the leading countries of the world we find that those countries who devote a substantial part of their revenues to social expenditure are the foremost in spending increasingly large sums on their defences (Army). The following figures will bear out the same view:—

(*Budget expenditure on defence in millions*)

Country			Currency	1913	1931-32	1937-38
United States	...		Dollars	131.1	707.4	993.2
United Kingdom	...		Pound Sterling	28.2	95.0	261.6
France	Franc	983.2	11,674.0	9,522.5
Italy	Lira	424.3	4,978.9	5,950.0
Japan	Yen	78.1	474.7	1,409.0
India	Rupees	298.4	579.7	...

* *Army Quarterly, April 1926.*

*1913 figures in the above table have been taken from Miss Johnson's NATIONAL DEFENCE, Page 180; 1932-33 and 1937-38 figures have been taken from the Armaments' Year Book for the respective years.**

The above figures also show that the budget expenditures of these countries show a regular increase every year. Instead of remodelling their budgets, what these countries appear to do is to cut small grants here and there with the ultimate object of keeping the whole of the defence budget intact. The position, therefore, today is that every nation wants to reduce its expenditure on defence, but at the same time there is a suspicion that others may not follow suit. This suspicious and jealous attitude is the root-cause of the dual policy that is being followed to-day. The repeated failures of the disarmament conference—or to put it more precisely, the successive postponement of the real issue—only strengthens the belief that these nations do not really want any reduction in their armed forces. As things are, the question is **whether** there can be any limit to the expenditure of money on armed forces in any particular country.

“We do not, however, consider that the Government of India should be satisfied with a Military Budget of Rs. 57 crores, and we recommend that a close watch be kept on the details of Military expenditure with the object of bringing about a progressive reduction in the near future. Should a further fall in prices take place we consider that it may be possible to reduce the Military expenditure to a figure not exceeding

* *Imperial Defence, By Stephen King-Hall, Page 190, and Army Quarterly, April 1926.*

Rs. 50 crores, although the Commander-in-Chief does not subscribe to this opinion. Even this is more, in our opinion, than the Indian tax-payer should be called upon to bear and revenues may increase through a revival of trade, but that would, we think, be no justification for not keeping a strict eye on Military expenditure with a view to its further reduction.”*

The imperative need for economy in public expenditure makes it essential that every pie spent should produce useful results and since expenditure on defence is necessarily unproductive, so far as immediate dividends are concerned, it is especially desirable that the tax-payer should understand the need and the effects of this expenditure. Public opinion in India, both within and without the Legislature has definitely pronounced itself against the heavy burdens placed by the Army Department of the Government of India on a country too poor to shoulder them.

Before 1921, there was no such thing as ‘Public Opinion’ in India, as far as the Army matters were concerned. The Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief were virtually the sole authorities on everything concerning Defence. Under these circumstances, the demands made by the Army Department were granted without any seeming opposition, with the result that, whereas, in other countries the defence expenditure is subject to the will of the people expressed by means of a vote, in India the Government did not care about the views of the people.

The question of Military expenditure is one of policy, and in the shaping of that policy the people of

* *Report of the Inchcape Committee, 1923, Para 4.*

this country have no voice. It may be argued that this is the opinion that may have been expressed by a non-official having no administrative experience of such an important department as the Army Department of the Government of India. But strange though it may appear, the Government of India themselves were apprehensive of an increase in their Army budget. As far back as the eighties of the last century, the Government of India in their Despatch to the Secretary of State for India, No. 168 of 16th. June 1879, expressed themselves as follows: "The retrenchment of our Military Expenditure is a graver and more complicated issue than the reduction of our civil establishments or our outlay on public works."

There are many officials and experts in India who are of the opinion that the present high expenditure on the Army is absolutely essential to protect India from foreign aggression. They even add that any reduction in the existing Army expenditure of India would adversely affect the efficiency of the Indian Army. Lord Rawlinson's famous speech in 1924 in the Central Legislature on the Military Estimates' discussion, opposing the popular demand for the reduction of the Army expenditure even by a single pie is characteristic of such a view. It is interesting to note at this juncture, that such an high authority as the late Lord Salisbury, pointed out some time ago that Military efficiency must always be relative, that is determined in the case of each country by a combined consideration of its needs of defence, and the resources it can devote for the purpose. Prof. Dalton also writes,* "The only economic test of the productiveness of any expenditure

* *Science of Public Finance*, by Prof. Dalton. Page 17.

is its productiveness of economic welfare." Military expenditure, as we have already observed, is a branch of national finance, and as such it is no exception to this general view.

As things stand at present, Indian finance is virtually at the mercy of military considerations and no well sustained or vigorous effort by the State on an adequate scale, for the material advancement or moral progress of the people is possible while the Indian revenues are liable to be appropriated in an ever increasing proportion for Military purposes. Since the Montford Reforms things have changed to some extent, but there is small relief to the people. As much as 80% of the total budget of the Government of India is still non-votable, and there is little hope for any improvement in the near future if the so-called safeguards are accepted.

*** Division of the total Defence Expenditure under the three heads.**

(Figures are in millions and for 1937-38)

Country	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
United Kingdom ...	82.1	95.2	79.7	257.0
United States ...	393.5	599.7	not seperatly shown)	993.2
Japan	720.0	681.0	„ „	1,401.0
France	5,857.3	1,810.7	1,249.4	8,917.4
Italy	2,215.6	1,694.9	1,155.8	5,065.3
Canada	17.8	4.5	11.7	34.0
India	477.69	8.38	21.70	507.77

* *Armament's Year Book 1937.*

It would be apparent from the above table that all countries appropriate the total defence expenditure amongst the three main heads of defence Army, Navy, and Air Force, roughly in proportion of 40%, 40%, and 20%. In certain cases, where for instance, the land frontiers are more important, as in the case of continental countries like France, or Italy, the Army vote is naturally more than the Navy vote. On the other-hand, where the sea-frontiers are more important as in the case of maritime countries like Great Britain or Japan, the Navy Estimates are bound to be more than the Army Estimates. We may however, generally conclude that all countries *except* India, spend their defence grants on all the three heads judiciously. A very prominent feature about India is the very high percentage of the Army expenditure to the total defence expenditure. In fact we may say that almost all the expenditure on defence in India is appropriated by the Military Department.

The economic condition of India during the post-war period has convinced everybody that if India is to survive the ruin that threatens her, she must put her house in order. Already the taxes imposed by the Government in this country have reached the maximum limit, and there is very little hope of an increase in the revenues in the near future. Both the Government and public leaders are strenuously thinking of reducing the expenditure, under each head of the Government of India. Under the circumstances the expenditure of the Military Department of the Government of India naturally attracts much attention. The Inchcape Committee of 1923, to which a reference has already been made, drew the attention of the Govern-

ment of India to the huge expenditure on the Army Department. The Army Sub-Committee of the Central Retrenchment Advisory Committee, appointed in 1931, recommended further reductions in the Military expenditure of the Government of India, to which the then Commander-in-Chief partially agreed.

Writing on *Public Finance* Prof. Dalton observes. "What can be afforded depends partly on how the money is spent and how it is raised." In India the annual budget is prepared irrespective of the views and the wishes of the people. This is especially true of the Army Estimates of the Government of India, as this is entirely a non-votable item. The result is that the Government of India may think any sum necessary for the Army Department and it is sanctioned without any difficulty. The people or the general public have no voice or control in it.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARMY

The East India Company was founded on the 31st of December 1599, to carry on trade between England and the East Indies, and other eastern countries. As a trading corporation, the East India Company, did not at first, find it necessary to maintain a large Military Force. But this need began to be felt when the Company's servants in India began the practice of interfering in the quarrels and internal jealousies of the various Native Princes in India. In 1681, for instance, the British Force in Bengal consisted of 20 men under a Corporal, and this was the maximum fixed by the order of the Nawab of Murshidabad. With the appointment of Duplex, an extra-ordinarily ambitious man, at the head of the French East India Company's affairs in India, the Anglo-French rivalry became sharpened and both the British and the French, became eager to oust, each other, right away from India. With the declaration of war in Europe between the English and the French, the first Anglo-French clash was witnessed in India.

It however, became obvious that neither of these two foreign companies trading in India, was in a position to maintain large forces and at the same time, being intensely jealous of each other and wishing all the while to drive the other out of India bag and baggage, would necessarily interfere in the internal quarrels, thereby involving themselves, subsequently, in the various 'Court-intrigues.'

The first phase of the Anglo-French rivalry ended with the peace of *Aix Le Chappelle*, in 1748, in Europe. The war with France, which was thus temporarily terminated, led to an increase in the Military Forces on both the sides in India. Between the years 1748-1754, though England and France were at peace in Europe, in India the respective Companies were virtually at war with each other, under the guise of the Hyderabad and Carnatic Wars.

While these events were taking place in southern India, Bengal was not much behind. A war had to be declared against Siraj-ud-Daullah the then Nawab of Bengal, and in the battle of *PLASSEY*, in 1757, the Company's Army defeated the Nawab's armed forces. As a result of this war, the East India Company secured territories in Bengal.

With the extension of territories and the acquisition of fresh riches, the policy of the authorities of the Company in England, which had so far been largely peaceful, also underwent a gradual change. The Company's officials in India, from the very beginning, favoured a policy of conquest. A large Army thus became an imperative necessity.

Since the last decade of the eighteenth century, England was fighting, tooth and nail, Napoleon and the rising power of the French. With a view to put a check on Napoleon's ambitions of helping the various Indian principalities against the English, the East India Company increased their forces in all the three presidencies.

At the time of the Napoleonic Wars, the most important of all the problems the English statesmen

had to face, was the almost impossible task of providing both men and material in Europe as well as in India. A novel arrangement, was however, made whereby the English statesmen were able to bring into practice the economic principles of "Division of Labour." Whereas in Europe, by treaties with Austria, Russia and other continental Allies, England agreed to supply abundant money,—at the same time saving man-power,—in India, they adopted the reverse procedure. It was fortunate for the English Statesmen in those days, to have an able man like Lord Wellesley as Governor-General of India. He, it was, who brought about a series of engagements and treaties with the various Indian principalities and thus enabled the Company to maintain ample and sufficient number of soldiers without, at the same time being required to spend a single pie for their upkeep. These alliances or engagements are known as **SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCES**. Sir Alfred Lyall says,* "The Subsidiary Treaties made in India differed from those made by England with other European states, in that, whereas, Austria and Russia raised armies on funds provided by England, in India Oudh and Hyderabad provided funds on which the British Government raised their armies."

In the course of an exposition of the state of Company's finances since the renewal of the Charter of 1793, the Court of Directors observed in 1808, "Whenever Great Britain is involved in a war, the effects were always felt in India in increased expenses, even when no European enemy appears in the field

* *British Dominion in India, Lyall, p. 247.*

there. But that war (the Napoleonic War) has been carried out into India, and at the desire of His Majesty's Government. The Company have had to sustain the expenses of various expeditions to the Dutch, French and Spanish possessions in India, and to Egypt, all chiefly on the national (England's) account." The Directors also pointed out that the Company had incurred a very heavy charge on account of the great increase in the number of King's Troops sent to India.

The real fact was that since the passing of the Pitt's India Bill, the Governor-General of India came to be appointed by the Prime Minister of England. This naturally resulted in the carrying out, by the Governor-General, a policy in conformity with the main lines of British foreign policy in those days. Thus the interests both of the people of India as well as those of the Company were set aside and wars, conquests and foreign relations involving huge amounts of money, were undertaken in the interests of the "Nation." The policy now in vogue is the same as before.

With the transfer of power from the East India Company to the Crown the Company's English Troops were amalgamated with the British Army. It was also decided that the number of British Troops in India should not, at any time, be more than 80,000 officers and men.

The main recommendations of the Peel Committee were as follows:—

- (1) The number of British Troops in India to be more than the pre-Mutiny strength;

(2) The ratio between the British and the Indian Troops was fixed at 2:1 for Bengal, and 3:1 for Madras and Bombay, as far as the Infantry and the Cavalry were concerned;

(3) The Artillery was to be mainly a British Force;

(4) The Military or the Armed Police Force should not be given a stricter Military Training;

(5) The Force maintained in India, its strength, etc., should be matters reserved for the Home Government;

(6) The Native Armies should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, mixed promiscuously throughout each Regiment.

The amalgamation of the former East India Company's English Troops under the Crown, was a subject of frequent attacks from various sources, and even the Military Finance Department of the Government of India in a letter dated 8th, September 1861, wrote, "The number of European Troops, now in India, is never the less larger, and the organisation of this Force also involves a high rate of expenditure; Imperial considerations, however, over which the Government of India have no control, having determined the Military formations, affect the Military changes."

As to the financial aspect of this amalgamation and thus indirectly maintaining an English Force in India, Sir David Waterfield, replying to a question put to him by the Egerton Committee of 1873, said, "On any such question as the reduction of the Military

Establishments, it is necessary to consult the Secretary of State for India, who in turn would have to consult the Secretary of State for War in the British Cabinet, to see whether any reduction of the British Force could be effected. As for the reduction of the Native Troops, the approval of the Secretary of State for India is necessary.”*

Since the British Forces in India were made a part and parcel of the British Army in England, any change in the organisation of the British Army—for instance an increase of pay, allowances, expenses for affording special facilities for new recruits, etc. reacted on India. A profound change in the organisation of the British Army took place in England, as a result chiefly of the successes gained by the Germans in the Austro-Prussian, and the Franco-German wars between 1860 and 1871. These changes in England are commonly known as Cardwell Reforms, inaugurated under the tenure of office of Lord Cardwell, the then Secretary of State for War in England. An attempt is made elsewhere, to discuss the principles underlying these reforms, and a summary of the chief features, will therefore, be noted below.

According to the Cardwell Reforms, the System of Short Service was introduced into the British Army which enabled the formation of, and the maintenance of large Reserves. Side by side, there were many rearrangements of pay, etc., all of which helped to treble the number of men annually enlisted, as also to build up the Reserves, which during the Boer War, yielded something like 80,000 men. These Reforms

* *Reply to Question No. 332.*

went a long way in increasing the expenditure of the British Garrison in India, from time to time, and over which the Government of India had no control.

The purposes for which the Army is maintained in India, according to the Esher Committee, may be stated as follows:—

- (1) Preventing or repelling attacks or threatened aggressions from foreign enemies beyond our border;
- (2) Making successful armed rebellion or resistance, within British India, or within the Feudatory States impossible.”

As regards the formation of Reserves, it is interesting to see what the Eden Committee said,* “There can be no doubt that the maintenance of Army Reserves in India, would greatly increase the offensive and the defensive power of the Indian Army. At the same time it must be remembered that our Native Army is a Mercenary Force, serving an alien Government. It would be practically inadvisable to adopt, for India the Short Service system of Europe, whereby the largest possible numbers of men are passed through the Army, returned into the general public, and are kept by periodical training in a state of Military Efficiency.”

In their endeavour to justify an increase of Military Expenditure of India, the Welby Commission, appointed to examine Indian Finance, appear to have forgotten altogether that there was a total absence of what is known as *PUBLIC OPINION*, or even for the

* *Eden Committee Report 1879. Para 259.*

matter of that even a 'Public' in this country! Moreover being under the thumb of the Secretary of State for India the Government of India were also unable to follow or to agree substantially to any spirited policy that was followed by the party in power in England and to which the then Secretary of State for India belonged, or even to shirk the attendant financial fetters or burdens imposed as a result of following that particular policy. The same Commission pointed out that three main causes contributed to the increase of Military Expenditure in India; (1) Increase in the Capitation Rate; (2) Increase in the British Troops in India; (3) Introduction of the deferred pay system.

In order to impress upon the minds of the people of India that since the World War they had acquired a substantial political importance, and as such the functions of the Indian Army have also not remained merely "local," the Esher Committee of 1919 said,* "India has now been admitted into a partnership with the Empire, and the Indian Army has fought alongside Troops from other parts of the Empire in every theatre of war. Its responsibilities have thus been widened and it can no longer be called or regarded as a local Force, whose sphere of activity is limited to India and the surrounding frontier territories."

The Inchcape Committee, appointed in 1923, to suggest a reduction in India's Military Expenditure, referring to the increased expenditure on British Troops, due to the adoption of new methods and equipment and reorganisation, etc. in Great Britain,

* *Easher Committee Report Part IV. Para 7.*

and its automatic adoption in India observed. "We consider that India is the largest employer of British Troops outside the United Kingdom. Prospective changes in the administration of these Troops, which involves large expenditure, should in every case be fully discussed with the Government of India before being put into effect, and that they should at least be given full opportunity of examining all such proposals in their relation to India."*

Since the close of the last World War, Indian public opinion is definitely advancing towards a goal, namely, Responsibility in Military Defence and the Military policy of the Government of India. In his report on the "Moral and Material Progress" of India during the year 1924-25, the Director of Public Information with the Government of India says, "In place of the old vague aspirations the educated classes in India now put forward two concrete demands of a definite character. In the first place, they ask for the rapid Indianisation of the King's Commissioned Ranks of the Regular Army; secondly, for the expansion of facilities which already exist for training Indians in the Territorial Force."

The two concrete demands referred above, were more or less embodied in a series of resolutions moved by Sir P. S. Shivaswami Aiyar, in the Legislative Assembly in 1921, and which were generally accepted by Sir Godfrey Fell, the then Military Member, on behalf of the Government of India. However, the attitude of the Government appeared to be ambiguous, till certain disclosures were made in the Defence

* *Inchcape Committee Report Para 55.*

Sub-Committee's proceedings at the time of the 1930 Round Table Conference, when a reference was made to the deliberations of a Committee under the direction of Lord Reading, the then Viceroy of India, which opined that complete Indianisation of the Indian Army could be brought about in less than 30 years. Unfortunately, this report is not published even now, in extenso, and in its absence it is hardly possible to draw any conclusions. It must be remembered however, that this Committee, known as the Rawlinson-Macmunn Committee consisted of almost all higher officers at the Army Headquarters in India, and as such, due weight must naturally be given to their opinions.

In 1927, according to a resolution passed by the Legislative Assembly, the Government of India appointed a Committee to inquire into the rate of Indianisation of the Army in India, the establishment of a Military College in India and many other allied matters. This Committee was presided over by Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew Skeen, the then Adjutant-General. This Committee called many witnesses, and also deputed some of its members forming a Sub-Committee, to visit foreign countries like the United States, France, Great Britain, etc., to study many of the Military problems there on the spot. The final report of this Committee includes the following important suggestions:

- (1) Indianisation of 50 per cent. of the total King's Commissions before 1952;
- (2) Opening of a Military College in India before 1932;

After a long or rather exasperating delay, the Government of India, after full consultations with the then Secretary of State for India as well as the Secretary of State for War in England, in the British Cabinet, announced their decisions on the Skeen Report. It would be no exaggeration to say, that the Government not only did not accept the conclusions of the Skeen Committee, but even went as far as to uphold their actions, especially the Eight Units' Scheme, in spite of its severest denunciation at the hands of the Skeen Committee.

In 1928, the Report of the All Parties Conference, was published. This report was primarily a rejoinder to the challenge given by the official block in the Legislative Assembly, to give in writing whatever the Non-Officials wanted, as the demands of India with regard to a further advance on constitutional lines. Though in itself a private un-official document, we would be failing in our duty not to mention it here. After quoting Sir Malcolm Hailey, that Dominion Status for India meant a Dominion Army under the full control of the Government of India, the report refers to Sir P. S. Shivaswami Aiyar's speech in the Legislative Assembly on the 18th of February 1923, which may be summarised as follows:—

"None of the Colonies was in a position to assume full charge of its Defence when Dominion Status was granted to it. For many years the Colonies were not even able to pay for their Defence. It was the Home Government that had to contribute towards the Military Expenditure of these Colonies."

* *Nehru Report 1928.* p. 13.

The All Parties Conference finally recommended, "It should be the first care of the responsible Government of India to make her self-contained in Military as well as in other matters."

The report of the Simon Commission of 1929, begins by saying,* "The plain fact is that the formation of an Indian National Army, drawn from India as a whole, in which Indian Officers will lead men, who may be of different classes and races, in which every member will recognise the rest as his comrade, and in which public opinion will have general confidence, is a task of the greatest possible difficulty."

As regards the demand for Indianisation of the Indian Army, and a share—if not the whole—of the control of the Army policy of India, it would be sufficient to quote the same report, as follows:† "It surely cannot be supposed that large bodies of British soldiers would remain available for the purpose of maintaining and restoring order when the Army in India is under a Minister responsible to an Indian Legislature."

As to the recommendations of the Simon Commission, it is not difficult to gather the true intentions of the Commissioners as regards the two most important "Concrete Demands," namely, the Indianisation of the Officers' Ranks of the Indian Army and the control of the Army policy in India. The Simon Commission Report rejected emphatically both these demands with the following observations; "The evidence we have heard and what we have seen in

* *Simon Commission Report, 1930. Vol. I p. 97.*

† *Ibid. p. 130.*

the course of our Indian tours, leave no doubts in our minds that at least for a very long time to come it will be impossible for the Army, entrusted with the task of defending India, to dispense with a very considerable British element, including in that term British Troops of all ranks, a considerable proportion of the Regimental officers of the Indian Army, and the British personnel in the higher commands. We regard it as beyond question that having regard to the Indian and Imperial questions involved, and the dangers to be faced, and to the composition of the force, Parliament cannot wash its hands of all responsibility for this Army. It is impossible to relinquish the control over an Army containing this element to Ministers, responsible to an elected Legislature.”*

The Simon Commission, therefore, emphatically rejected all proposals relating to transfer of control of the Regular Army in India, both British and Indian, to “responsible” Ministers. However, in order to allay the fear that may be aroused by such a recommendation, the report refers to the existing practise in the self-Governing Dominions or Colonies in the British Empire where there are what is called *Dominion Forces* under a Dominion Minister. The Report says, “A solution would, probably have to be found by a definite agreement between India and Great Britain *Acting on behalf of the Empire*. Many points would have to be settled, and we can only indicate the general lines that might be found to be practical. Such a scheme assumes that the Forces composing the existing Army in India, would no longer be under the control of the Government of India but

* *Simon Commission Report 1930. Vol. II. Page 16.*

would be under the Imperial authority, which would naturally be the Viceroy, acting in concert with the Commander-in-Chief. It would involve an undertaking by the Imperial Government of the obligations of Imperial Defence in return for the continued provision of definite liabilities as to recruitment areas, transport and other matters. And it would, of course, involve an equitable adjustment of burdens of finances, which we do not attempt to prejudge, but which would perhaps, most naturally take the form of an agreement to provide from Indian revenues an annual total sum, subject to revision at intervals, and with the opportunities of sharing in economies. *This contribution would be non-votable.*"*

The above suggestion of the Simon Commission means the repetition of past history. Soon after the battle of Plassey, the East India Company secured from the then Mughal Emperor a *sanad*, relating to the grant of *diwani*, of the province of Bengal. Under this arrangement, the revenues were to be collected by the Company, while the remaining functions, such as keeping order in the country, etc. were to be exercised by the Nawab's Government. This administration is known in Indian History as *double government*. A like policy is suggested by the Simon Commission for adoption in India. The Army in India to be of two kinds, (i) The Imperial Army; like the present British Force stationed in this country, under the control of the representative of the British Government, namely the Viceroy; and (ii) the Local Force or the so-called Dominion Army, under the control of Dominion Defence Minister. The

* *Simon Commission Report 1930. Vol. II Page 175.*

moneys for both the Forces are to be supplied by India in a lump sum every year, according to a contract to be entered into by the two parties, India and Great Britain. The grant for the expenses of the Imperial Force is to remain beyond the pale of the elected members of the Central Legislature of India.

The Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference observed that,* "The political principle upon which we have to express our opinion with regard to Defence is that, India should be in a position to take over her Defence as soon as possible." After much deliberation the same Committee passed the following important resolutions by general agreement:—

- (1) The Sub-Committee consider that, with the development of the new political structure in India, the Defence of India must, to an increasing extent, be the concern of the Indian Government alone;
- (2) In order to give practical effect to the above principle, they recommend, (a) immediate steps be taken to make it commensurable with the main object in view, having regard to all relevant considerations, such as the maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency; (b) In order to give effect to (a), a Training College in India be established at the earliest possible moment, in order to train candidates for commissions in all Arms of the Indian Defence Service; (c) In order

* *Proceedings of the Defence Sub-Committee R. T. C. Page 365.*

to avoid delay, the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of Experts, both British and Indian, and including Representatives of the Indian Native States, to work out the details of the establishment of such a college.

- (3) The Committee also recognises the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British Troops in India, to the lowest possible figure, and consider that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation.

It will be quite clear now that much water has passed between the Simon Commission's recommendations and the proceedings of the Round Table Conferences. According to the suggestion of the Defence Sub-Committee, the Government of India appointed a Committee of experts, consisting of Officials, Non-Officials, and Representatives of Indian States to go into the question of the establishment of a Military College in India, under the presidency of Sir Phillip Chetwood, who was then the Commander-in-Chief of India. During the first or the preliminary sitting of this Committee of Experts, the Chairman on behalf of the Government of India announced the Government's decision to fix the annual intake of the proposed Military College at 60. This number was exclusive of the Cadets from the Indian State Forces.

The Commander-in-Chief of India also declared at this meeting that it had been already decided by Government to abolish the Viceroy's Commissions in the Indian Army, as far as the Indianised Units were

concerned and that such posts would be filled in thenceforth by the Cadets passing out of the Indian Military Academy. It was argued that the system prevalent in India of having two classes of Officers, namely, King's Commissioned Officers and the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers in the one and the same Unit was unique in the whole world. Being, moreover, cumbersome the time had then come to abolish the Viceroy's Commissions and thus to reorganise the Indian Army on the British model.

The effects of these far-reaching changes have been considered in a separate chapter *Indianisation*. But these two official pronouncements were not liked, it appears, by the members of the Indian Military College Committee, including even the representatives of the Indian States. This will be apparent from the various Minutes of dissent appended to the same report. One member, Sir Abdur Rahim, for instance, says,* "An output of 60 officers per year, at first appears to double the rate of Indianisation. And it might indeed produce that effect, if it were not accompanied with the condition that the graduates of the College will displace the present Viceroy's Commissioned Officers, in the interests of the Units,—a condition, which makes an apparent increase in Indianisation by means of this College entirely illusory."

Before concluding, we cannot but refer, though in passing, to the Committee set up by the Indian Legislative Assembly, to suggest retrenchments in the Military Budget of the Government of India. This Committee, known as the Central Retrenchment Advisory Committee had very wide and exhaustive

* *Indian Military College Committee Report page 30.*

terms of reference. This Committee was also assisted throughout its deliberations by a representative of the British War Office, Mr. A. C. Bovenschen. The report of this Committee remarks in the beginning,* "Our inquiry is restricted to the administrative and the business side of the Army, and that the strength and organisation of the Fighting Services are not open to our consideration." Before proceeding with the Committee's work, it would be better to examine the circumstances under which this Committee was set up. Since 1923, or thereabouts, the Government of India found themselves at their wit's ends to make the two ends of their annual budget meet. This was particularly the case since 1929, due chiefly to world-wide trade depression, but also to political unrest in the country, and the consequent falling off of the Government receipts. To counteract this deficiency, the Government found it unavoidable to examine the question of retrenchment in every sphere of Government activity. The Legislative Assembly was also continually raising its voice in favour of retrenchment. Hence this Committee was appointed.

Just at this time, that is about 1927-28, the Government of India found themselves in a dilemma. As the Financial Secretary pointed out in his explanatory memorandum, "On the one hand the equipment of the Forces had fallen and were progressively falling down below modern standards. It was estimated that an outlay of about Rs. 10 crores within a short period, was required, to put the Army

* *Army Sub-Committee of the Central Advisory Committee Report 1931, Page 4.*

and the Air Force into a condition in which they could be regarded as up-to date Forces in terms of the policy accepted by the Government and endorsed by the Legislative Assembly. On the otherhand, the finances of the Government of India would not contemplate an increase in the Military Expenditure. The eventual solution found was the decision to standardise the Military Budget for a period of four years, at an annual figure of Rs. 55 crores, in the hope that on that figure and within that period the Military authorities, with permission to utilise savings which they might make, would be able to complete the Rs. 10 crores programme."*

Serious objections might be taken to this innovation of establishing a Departmental Budget, and thus to allow the said Department to save as much as possible, and also to allow that department to utilise the saving thus effected to pay for its extra needs. It is worth noting that the Military Budget at that time was Rs. 55 crores. Now leaving say, Rs. 3½ crores, as the charge for capital programme, the Army Department would say that it is essential to have Rs. 55—3½ or Rs. 51½ crores for their normal expenditure. But for the year 1933-34, the Budget Estimates provide a sum of only about Rs. 46·20 crores!

The Army Sub-Committee of the Central Retrenchment Advisory Committee issued an interim report in 1932, and a final report in 1933. In their interim report the Committee observe, "Whatever the accepted policy might be as to the objects for which

* *Explanatory Memorandum of the Budget 1932-33, Page 40.*

the Army in India is maintained, the lessons learnt in the Great War must have affected the Military outlook as to the efficiency and the Military preparedness, and we cannot help sharing the doubts expressed by the last Innes Committee of 1922 in regard to the Army Headquarters, whether the Government of India appreciated to the fullest extent the financial repurcussion which that scheme of organisation and reorganisation would involve, and whether the standard of efficiency aimed at, did not involve a cost higher than this country could permanently afford.”*

As a result of the recommendations of this Committee indirectly, if not directly, the Army Budget has been cut down to Rs. 46 crores and odds for the financial year 1933-34. Since 1933-34, the name *Defence Services Estimates* has been given to the Military Estimates of the Government of India.

* *Explanatory Memorandum on the Budget 1932-33, p. 8.*

CHAPTER III

DEFENCE ORGANISATION IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

Before discussing the adequacy or otherwise of the Defence Services of India, it would be instructive to know the Defence Organisations of some of the more important countries of the world. The British Organisation will be taken first.

GREAT BRITAIN.

The British Army consists of:—

- (1) The Regular Forces at Home and Abroad, with their Reserves, including the Militia and the Supplementary Reserve;
- (2) The Territorial Army;
- (3) The Supplementary Reserve;

Out of the 20 Regular Cavalry Regiments, 8 Regiments are abroad including 5 in India. Out of the 63 Regular Infantry Regiments, (each comprised of 2 Battalions, or a total of 126 Battalions), 63 Battalions are at Home, 10 in the Colonies, 6 in Egypt, 2 in Sudan and the remaining 45 Battalions in India.

The strength of the Army Reserve at various times was as follows:—

Year	1914	1919	1922	1932	1936
Number	5,176	1,956,368	74,000	124,509	121,200

Recruitment for the British Army is voluntary. Recruitment for the Territorial Army is carried out

under the authority of the County Councils or Associations, with the assistance of the Adjutants and the Permanent Staff of their sister Regular Units. The following are the details of the Territorial Army:—

Year	1913	1922	1929	1936
Actual Strength	245,779	134,769	139,791	139,577

The Officers' Training Corps is organised to impart Military Training to students at Schools and Colleges. The following table gives the strength of the Officers' Training Corps for the year 1931.

Class	Officers	Cadets	Total
Senior Division	163	4,412	4,577
Junior Division	680	34,581	34,661

In Great Britain, though Military Service is Voluntary, some sort of Military Training is given to all, whether they are School boys, Under-graduates of Universities, or other class of citizen.

The following table shows the strength of the Army under all categories in 1926-27 and 1931-32:—

Regular Army, (excluding British			
Troops in India)	142,431
Colonial and Native Indian Troops	3,426
Army Reserve	96,000
Supplementary Reserve	23,000
Militia and Channel Islands	1,325
Militia, (Malta and Bermuda)	1,437
Territorial Army	189,093
Officers' Training Corps	1,245
British Troops in India	61,543
<hr/>			
Total	5,19,500
			4,71,285

From the foregone figures it would appear that the total strength of the Armed Forces of Great Britain has been reduced from about 5,19,500 in 1926-27 to about 4,71,285 in 1931-32. This, however, is only a slight reduction. Coming to the details we find that the Regular Army, which was 142,432 in 1926-27, was reduced to 137,737 in 1931-32. In the same way, there was a slight reduction in the Colonial and Native Indian Troops as well as a reduction in the British Forces stationed in India. Thus the Territorial Army strength appears to have been reduced, but then, if we happen to look at the figures of the Reserve strength we find that the Army Reserve, which was 96,000 in 1926-27 rose to 124,209 in 1931-32, which means an increase of nearly 29,000 men. These increasing Reserves enabled the Government to reduce the Standing Army, a factor which is very important from the point of view of India.

From an analysis of the Defence Expenditure of Great Britain we come to know that, whereas Great Britain spent £9,557,000 on pay, etc., of the Regular Army in 1926-27, the amount on the same item in 1931-32 was £9,500,000. As we have seen already, the strength of the Regular Army in 1926-27 and 1931-32 respectively shows a reduction of about 3,116 men which we may safely say, resulted in bringing about a saving of some £27,000. Now the Budget for the Territorial Army and also the Territorial Army Reserve for the years 1926-27 and 1931-32 is shown to be £5,143,000 and £5,480,000 respectively or an increase of £337,000. While the strength of the Territorial Army and also the Territorial Army Reserves shows in 1926-27 and 1931-32 was 280,681 and 303,672 respectively,

the increase of expenditure for the two years was only about £337,000. For an increase in the Regular Army by a like number, that is by about 23,000 men, something like £427,000 would have been required. The saving thus effected is about £100,000. In this way, with a reduction of expenditure and a reduction of the Regular Army, the same or even increased efficiency and Military strength has been maintained by organising the Reserves, and this too in a country like England, where Compulsory Military Service is looked down bitterly, by all and sundry.

Let us turn our attention, now, to the Defence Organisation of Australia. Australia is a Self-Governing Dominion, and its example should be particularly helpful to us in organising our needs and requirements as also the future position and possibilities, in view of the fact that India is shortly going to be the *Sixth* Self-Governing Dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations!

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCES.

The Military Forces of Australia consist of a Permanent Force and a Citizen Force. All male inhabitants who have resided in Australia for *six months* or more, and who are British subjects, and who are also between the ages of 18-60, are in times of War, liable to serve in the Citizen Force. All boys attaining the age of 14 years, have to be registered, and they undergo Cadet-Training at School. On an average about 17,000 boys of the ages of 16 years and more are transferred annually to the Citizen Force.

The term of Service in the Citizen Force is 5 years, with re-engagement for a further period of 5 years,

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upto the age of 60. In addition to the Compulsory Military Training for young and old, Rifle Clubs have been organised and conducted to keep the civilian men in practice. The number of members of these clubs numbered approximately 43,000 in 1928.

On the 1st. of March 1931, the strength of the Permanent Force was 1,556 and that of the Militia Force 29,726. In the same year, out of a total Military Expenditure of £1,184,000 as much as £558,000 were spent on the Permanent Force, whereas, only £190,000 sufficed for Universal Military Training, including the Citizen Forces and similar organisations.

A comparison between expenditure on the Permanent and Citizen Forces for the years 1927-28 (£397,000 and 134,000 respectively) and 1931-32 (£558,000 and £190,000 respectively), will bring out the fact that, though the expenditure on both the Forces has increased, a comparison on the increase in the expenditure on each of the two proves that Australia, is following the example of other countries in reducing the Permanent Force, and at the same time making it up by an increase in the Reserves, thus following a policy of Maximum of efficiency with a Minimum of Costs. Since 1929, Conscription in Australia, has been replaced by Voluntary enlistment after 18 years. This will remain in force during peace-time only.

In addition to the facilities granted to the younger generation for receiving Military Training, the Australian Government gives subsidies in cash and also in the form of free ammunition to civilian Rifle-Clubs. In 1931-32, for instance, as much as £54,000 were spent

on subsidies to Rifle-Clubs, over and above the free services of the Permanent staff provided by the Australian Government.

CANADIAN DEFENCES.

The Canadian Government is also making efforts on the lines suggested above, to train the Canadians in the various intricacies of Military Training. All male inhabitants between the ages of 18 and 60 (excluding those that are exempted or disqualified by Law), and who are British Subjects, are liable for service in the Militia, in the event of a *Levee en Masse*.

The Militia of Canada is classified as follows:—

- (1) Regular; and
- (2) Reserve;

The Regular Militia is further sub-divided into:—

- (a) Permanent Force; and
- (b) Non-Permanent Force;

The Regular Militia consists of Corps raised by Voluntary enlistment with an agreement of three years' service, renewable by one year upto a maximum of 60. The strength of this Force in 1931 was 3,800. The Non-Permanent Regular Militia is made up of Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Signallers, and the Infantry Corps. The total establishment of the Non-Permanent Force or Militia in 1931 was 9,050 officers and 116,545 other ranks.

The Militia Reserve consists of:—

- (1) Regular Units of the City and Rural Corps;
- (2) Reserve Depots;
- (3) Reserves of Officers;

These organisations are further supplemented by numerous Cadet-Corps and Rifle Associations. The Rifle Associations are for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the people in general in Rifle-shooting. These Rifle Associations are of the following two kinds:—

- (a) Military Rifle Associations; These number about 195, with a membership of about 12,734;
- (b) Civilian Rifle Associations; These number 71, and have a membership of 4,216.

Under section 59 of the Militia Act, the Minister of National Defence in Canada would authorise boys of 12 years of age, and who are attending Schools, to be formed into School-Cadet Corps. The number of Cadets thus enrolled at the close of the Cadet year 1929-30 was 130,000.

An analysis of the Defence Expenditure of Canada for the year 1931-32 shows that the expenditure on the Permanent Force was 5,011,000 Dollars out of a total Army Expenditure of 11,112,000 Dollars. The Non-Permanent Militia accounted for 2,324,000 Dollars. This proves again, the fact that, Canada is also adopting the policy of maximum of efficiency at the minimum of costs.

So far we briefly reviewed the Defence systems and expenditure thereon, of Great Britain and the two Self-Governing Dominions, Australia and Canada. Before discussing the position in India, it would be

interesting to see the methods in vogue in countries outside the British Empire such as France, Italy, Japan, etc.

FRENCH DEFENCES.

The French are staunch believers in Conscription. After the 20th. year, all men (with the exception of those medically unfit, or otherwise disqualified) are liable for service in the Regular Army, for 1 year, and afterwards in the Reserves for 24 years. This enables the French Government to have the whole nation ready to defend the country, when called upon to do so at the minimum cost. In addition to the above, the French people also have a large number of Colonial Troops, who are armed and trained on the same lines as the French Army. The defence systems of Germany and Italy run practically on the same lines as that of France.

The Japanese conditions approximate to those in India. The whole of the population of Japan is divided into two main classes:—(1) Martial; these are absolutely fit; (2) Non-Martial; these are only fit; the fittest are taken up for the Standing Army wherein they serve for two years, before being transferred to the First-Line Reserves. After serving in the First-Line Reserve, the men are transferred to the Second-Line Reserve. At the age of 38, these men form a part of the Territorial Army, and thus every man fulfils his contract of 20 years' service. The Japanese Second-Reserves consist of men who are not upto the mark for enlistment into the Standing Army. After serving in the Second-Line of Reserve for 12 years,

the men join along with the "fittest" in the Territorial Army, and thus complete their contract.

AMERICAN DEFENCES

The American tact and shrewdness is of universal repute. It is no wonder, therefore, that they have been able to effect conscription without the word appearing on the Army Statute-Book.

The American Army is organised into:—

- (1) Regular or the Standing Army;
- (2) National Guards;
- (3) The Reserves.

A two-year course in Military training under Government supervision is in force, in all Schools and Colleges. This course resembles to a great extent the Officers' Training Corps in Great Britain. The National Guards of the United States of America also strike a resemblance to the Indian Defence Force in India; the one and only contrast between the two is that unlike the Indian Defence Force, the Federal Government of the United States of America pays large subsidies to various States for the maintenance of these National Guards.

Since realities must be faced, let us see some of the salient features about the Defence system of India. The Defence Forces of India consist of the following:—

- (1) Regular Units of the British Army;
- (2) The Units of the Indian Army;
- (3) The Units of the Territorial and Auxiliary Forces;

(4) The Indian Army Reserve;

(5) The Indian States' Forces.

The British Units are a part of the Regular British Army, and hence are purely Foreign or British. The Indian Army mostly consists of Indians, though there are a number of Non-Indians recruited as soldiers, over and above the fact that almost all King's Commissioned Officers are British. The Auxiliary Force organised in 1920, is confined to persons of British Extraction. Enrolment in this Force is Voluntary. In 1931, the strength of the Indian Auxiliary Force was 30,000 men.

The Indian Territorial Force, also brought into existence, in 1920, is organised on the lines of the Militia. It is intended to form a Second Line of Defence, to the Regular Indian Army, and that this Force, that is the Indian Territorial Force, should step in as such. The strength of the Indian Territorial Force in 1930 was 15,000 men divided into 18 Provincial and 11 University Units.

The Indian Army Reserve has been constituted only recently. It consists of the following:—

Class A: This consists of men who have completed 5-10 years of Regular Army Service;

Class B: This consists of retired Non-Commissioned Officers;

Class C: This consists of Sepoys and Non-Commissioned Officers who are not fit for Class B.

CHAPTER IV

THE SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM

Without going deep into the history of the British Army, it will be apparent that the principle enunciated by Lord Cardwell, about the end of the last century when he was Secretary of State for War, still holds good and therefore, the British Army of to-day is still maintained on the Cardwell system. This system owes its origin to the successes of the German Army at Sedan and other places, during the Austro-Prussian and the Franco-Prussian Wars, in the latter half of the last century.

Till about the year 1871, the British Army was recruited on what is known as the Long-Service System, so that a soldier once enlisted into the Army, was required to serve therein for a very long period, namely 21 years or even more. In those days, the Spirit of "Nation-in-Arms" was not accepted, with the result that in a *laissez-faire* country like England, recruiting for the Army was purely on a Voluntary basis.

Just as Prussia, under its famous ruler, Frederick the Great revolutionised her Army organisation during the eighteenth century, so it was Germany during the last century which swept Feudalism aside, educated the people, and in return exacted from every able-bodied man, three years of his life, absolutely without regard to caste distinctions.* This example of Prussia

* *War and World's Life*—Colonel Maude p. 10.

was followed soon by all other European countries including even the Maritime powers like England.

The Cardwell Reforms consisted mainly of reforms in recruiting, in Localisation, and also in Linked-Battalions. Under these Reforms a soldier was enlisted for service in the Regular Standing Army for a period of about seven years, after which the recruit was transferred to the Reserve which meant another five years' service, thus bringing the total service to twelve years.

The Localisation of the Army was completed by the Introduction of what is known as the Territorial System in 1882, whereby men recruited in a particular area were placed among their own men. For instance, the Dorsetshire Regiment now consists of men who are almost entirely recruited from the same locality or area, namely Dorsetshire.

The system of Linked-Battalions was dictated by the necessity of maintaining Indian and other Colonial Army organisations at full strength, the underlying principle being that each Regiment should have one Battalion at Home and one Abroad, the latter being fed by the former, which in its turn drew upon its Reserves to complete its full War-Strength.* Thus the first step was to copy the German model of making the service in the ranks for three years only. Some difficulties, however, stood in the way. The system necessitated a very large number of recruits annually, and secondly, all men of the old School prophesied that Short Service would be very unpopular with the public, and would therefore, affect the Recruiting

* *Encyclopaedia Britannica* Vol. V pp. 677-90.

Market. Again the Indian reliefs necessitated the bringing Home and the sending out, each year, a third of the whole white Army. A bargain was, therefore, struck by which the contract was that the recruit should serve in the Army for a period of six years only as Colour-Service, and the remaining six years was to be in the Reserves.

The introduction of the principle of Short-Service in the British Army inevitably brought about the following consequences:—

- (1) It created large numbers of Reserves;
- (2) More and still more men came to be trained in the various Arms of the Defence Services of the country;
- (3) The pay of the British soldier had to be raised considerably;
- (4) Provision had to be made for the future of the soldier in respect of his employment after his leaving the Army;

Without going deep into the matter whether the new recruit was beneficial to the National Interests of Great Britain or not, both from the point of view of Military Efficiency and Monetary costs, let us consider the effects of these Reforms on India.

As in common knowledge, every Army Reform in England whether major or minor, is automatically introduced into India as far as the British Forces are concerned. It is also common knowledge that some of the charges saddled upon India on account of the introduction of Short Service System are:—

- (1) Transport Charges, for British Troops;
- (2) Military Dairies for the supply of Milk;

- (3) Military Ecclesiastical Department over and above the Civil Department;
- (4) Hill Sanatoria for the British Troops;
- (5) Some of the Army Educational Institutions, which are reserved wholly or in part, for the use of the British Troops;
- (6) Increase in the Non-Effective Charges:

Hence it was that the late Hon. G. K. Gokhale, speaking on the Budget Estimates of the Government of India, in the Imperial Council in 1903 observed, "The British Troops in India are under the Short Service System. Owing to the peculiarity of the situation, the main advantages of the Short Service System, namely securing for the country a large body of trained recruits, goes to England, while all the disadvantages of this system, namely the paucity of seasoned soldiers increased payments to the British War Office for recruitment and other charges, etc. have to be borne by us."

As to the working of this system, Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside says,* "A lad of 18 or 19 enlists and serves his preliminary training in Great Britain. He is sent abroad at 19 or 20 and returns Home again after five or six years of foreign service, at the age of 25 or 26. He then passes to the Reserves until he is about 30 years of age. After that age a soldier can no longer be considered at his best for service in the ranks; and therefore, he returns to civil life."

* *Study of War*—Maj. Gen. Ashton p. 125.

It would be clear, therefore, that with the introduction of Short Service in the British Army, the financial burden upon India has increased as much as five times or more than before. For example consider a soldier serving under the old system of Long Service, under which he would have been required to serve for about 21 years. For such a soldier India would be required to pay recruiting and training charges—the same as at present.—After 21 years of service, he would be entitled to a pension. Under the new system, however, a man is recruited only for a short period of service, of which only a small portion, say about four years, is spent in India. The result is that instead of keeping a man for 21 years, we now have about five people for the same period. Therefore, it is clear that India has to pay recruiting charges for these five men instead of only one as in the past. Under the new system, again, Transport charges have increased in a like manner, in view of the necessity for conveying five men during the same period of about 20 years. Then on the top of this, the initial pay of the soldier under the new system has increased enormously as compared to the pay of the soldier under the old system. Lastly, an additional expenditure is required to give this new recruit such education as would enable him to earn his living after he has left the Army. Sir Charles Dilke says,* “We have attempted to introduce Short Service, and have thus enormously increased the burdens of expenditure on India.”

The Eden Committee of 1879, in their report observed, “The Short Service System recently introduced into the British Army has increased the cost,

* *The British Army—Sir Charles Dilke, p. 42.*

and has materially reduced the efficiency of the British Troops in India. We cannot resist the feeling that in the introduction of this system, the interests of the Indian tax-payer were entirely left out of consideration."* Even Military Experts, therefore, and high officials expressed themselves against the introduction of Short Service in India, both from the point of view of efficiency and expenditure. The same Committee observes,* "We desire to invite the attention to the unnecessary expenditure that is often incurred in providing double accommodation for the same troops, both in the plains and in the hills."

The views expressed by the Government of India themselves on this question are worth consideration, "It is evident that responsible Indian authorities have to approach the question of Short Service from an entirely different point of view. A reserve of British Troops available for service in India would, no doubt, be very useful; but the Indian Government cannot look upon its peace establishment mainly in the light of a school or training ground for a reserve. On the contrary, the first and the foremost feature in any organisation, suitable to the wants of India is, that a relatively high peace establishment should be maintained in order to preserve internal order. We are unwilling to use the commonplace argument that India is held by the sword; because although it is true, we do not consider it the whole truth; and moreover, we disagree with many of the conclusions which are frequently drawn from this argument. There can, however, be no doubt that, British rule in India rests upon

* *Eden Committee Report, Para 207*

force, moral and physical, and as an inevitable consequence of this condition of things such a question as that of Short Service in the Army, with the attendant issue involved in the constitution of the reserve, must be approached when considering Indian requirements, from a point of view wholly different from that which would be adopted in considering recruitment in England. Under these circumstances, we do not see any partnership, properly so called, is possible.”*

Before the introduction of Short Service in England and automatically in India, there were, as far as the British Troops were concerned, what are known as *local troops*. These troops were recruited in England and sent to India, where they remained for the full period of their service. Naturally, it was the opinion of the many, that such a system of *local troops* should be allowed to continue, since finances of India were too poor to afford the extra cost. The Eden Committee said, for instance,† “We cannot fail to see that the substitution of the Local Troops would cause a saving of from about £160,000 to £240,000 per year. But this would deprive the British Army of the valuable training which Indian service now furnishes.”

In this way, regardless of the interests of India, and regardless of the fact that high financial burdens would be thrown upon the financial resources of India, the Short Service System was introduced in India with the sole object of providing a valuable training to British Troops without any extra cost whatsoever, to the British Exchequer.

* *Government of India despatch 10th August 1893*

† *Eden Committee Report, Para 185*

The general public opinion in this country strongly favours the creation of some such reserves from amongst the Indians. This may clearly be seen from the resolution moved in the 1921 Legislative Assembly by that Veteran Indian Leader, Sir P. S. S. Aiyar. His resolution was to the effect that, "This Assembly recommends to the Governor-General-in-Council that in view of the need for the preparation of India to undertake the burden of self-defence, and in the interests of economy, it is essential that a serious effort be made, (a) To organise and to encourage the formation of adequate Territorial Forces on attractive conditions; (b) To introduce into the Indian Army a system of Short Colour Service, followed by a few years in the Reserves; (c) To carry on gradual and prudent reduction of the ratio of British and Indian Troops."*

The above resolution, along with many others on the same subject, moved by the same gentleman, and relating to the Defence Problems of India, was accepted by the Government. But upto now, the Government have not acted upon their words, with the exception that, the new regulations for the recruits to the Indian Army are modified in such a way as would make an outsider believe that there is real Short Service System introduced into the Indian Army. As long as, however, the old policy of choosing the recruits from specified classes or provinces remains there as before, there is hardly any chance of having any desired effect, both upon the finances as well as the social well-being of the people in this country.

* *Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol. I. p. 1694.*

That Short Service, if introduced into India, would prove to be a boon to the people in general, need hardly be doubted. Even at the risk of repetition, we may just once more point out that Short Service,—or a similar other system—has been found to be very wholesome to the people of every country or nation. Lieutenant-Colonel C. Delme Radcliffe, while discussing the pros and cons of introducing Conscription in England, observes,* “There is in the country (Great Britain) the conviction that apart from the possibility or probability of the Army being required for the defence of the country, the training to arms and to discipline are morally and physically of the utmost direct advantage to the manhood of the people of a nation. *IT IS A SCHOOL FOR THE NATION. IT IS AN INTIMATE FACTOR OF THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE PEOPLE, AND IN MANY RESPECTS, THE BACKBONE OF THE NATION.*”

The same author further observes,† “In the Army all classes, all trade, all professions are represented, and the peculiarities, qualities, and capabilities of each of such classes, trades, and professions, are very much turned to account, for the benefit of general efficiency. The doctor and the chemist in civil life serve in the Army Medical Corps; the Electrician, the Mechanic and the Engineer in the Engineers; the Bus and the Cab drivers, as Artillery drivers; the farmers and the horse-owning classes in the Cavalry; the butchers and the barbers in the Supply Departments; and so on. Thus for many, the military training is not even an

* *Territorial Army in Being*. Lt. Col. C. Delme Radcliffe, p. 17.

† *Ibid.* P. 23.

interruption in their usual occupations, for they combine them not for their own interests, but in pursuit of greater end."

As against this it would be equally interesting to see how the entire population of a nation can be transformed under the Short Service System. The same author observes,* "Conscription forms an integral part of the national education, and conducive to the moral and the material welfare of the Swiss people; it brings together all classes of the community in friendly companionship and co-operation in a commonsense; and it appears to entail but slight interference with the industrial life of the people." And again, "Employers of labour in Switzerland consider that, the small loss in working time is more than compensated for by the increased efficiency of the man."

In short, Conscription is so very advantageous and conducive to the best interests and the general welfare of the people of a country, *INDIA including*, that it is but natural that every Indian should eagerly await that day when such a system is introduced by the Government in this country.

* *Territorial Army in Being*.—Lt. Col. C. Delme Radcliffe, p. 409.

CHAPTER V

CAPITATION AND NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGES

The first thing that strikes any layman in going through the Army Estimates of the Government of India is the enormous payment, made annually, by India to England for services rendered by the British Army in India, which are mostly in the form of pensions to retired officers, Other Ranks, and other incidental expenses.

Under the heading "Payments made in England" in the Army Estimates, which by the way come to about Rs. 13 crores every year, there are two items, (1) The Non-Effective Charges; (2) The Capitation charges. Let us consider the Capitation Charges first.

The Capitation Charges are those made by the British Government for the British Troops lent for service to India, and which the Indian Government has to pay every year. India pays the current charges as pay, allowances, etc., as also the charges for the recruitment of this force. It is argued in favour of this charge that India would have been required to incur the same or similar expenditure had she raised local troops in England as she did before.

It is, however, worth remembering that this charge is made for the British Troops or Force serving in India. Naturally, it goes without saying that so long as some British Force is maintained in India,

howsoever small it may be, payment to the British Treasury will have to be made by the Indian Government. Similarly this charge is to be paid 'per capita,' and any increase in the total number of this Force would automatically increase the amount thus payable, and is hence shown in the Army Budget. It must also be borne in mind that this charge is to be paid in England in English Currency, that is in pound sterling, and as such any fluctuation in the rupee-sterling ratio would affect the budgeted amount to some extent at least.

British Troops first landed in India when the island of Bombay was transferred from the Crown to the East India Company, in 1689. For about a hundred years or so from this date, this small force remained as it was in numbers, but soon it was found that this force was insufficient to the growing needs of the Company. In 1781, the East India Company was ordered to pay two lakhs of rupees current, per regiment consisting of thousand men, sent or to be sent by the Crown to India, on requisition from the Company.* Till 1781, however, the East India Company did not pay any extra money to the British exchequer besides the normal expenditure. This rate of Rs. 2 lakhs per regiment was in vogue for a very long time (at this time one pound sterling equivalent to about ten rupees).

The above charge appears to be only in the form of rent charged by England, for the force lent to the East India Company. The Company soon realised the

* *East India Finance in the days of the Company.*—Prof. Q. N. Banerji, p. 355.

ever increasing rent-bill for the British Troops lent for their use, and eventually petitioned to Parliament for some relief about 1793. As a result of this petition, Parliament enacted a new law by which it ordained that all actual charges on account of the King's Troops were, thenceforth, to be borne by the Company. The term "Actual Charges" however, very soon proved to be too vague. The Pay-Master General in England obtained from the Company not only the salaries and allowances of the officers and Other Ranks of the British Army, but also the recruitment and Transport charges, besides all other incidentals.

In this way, a beginning was made both of the **Capitation** and the **Non-Effective Charges**. In the year 1822, The East India Company agreed to pay a further sum of Rs. 5,60,000 for the retiring pay, pensions and other allowances of His Majesty's Forces stationed in India. The following extract from the Report of the famous Welby Commission is reproduced here to give to the reader a peep into the details of these Capitation Charges:—

"Main items in the Capitation Charges include:—

- (1) Enlisting and temporary training of the recruit for the Arm to which he would belong. This includes the cost of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers who train the recruits, and the charge for those recruits who desert or die, during the first year of their service, that is a charge for the waste;
- (2) Pay of young Officers, appointed to vacancies in the Force and awaiting orders to sail, and

CAPITATION & NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGES 53

of those appointed to Royal Engineers, who undergo a training for two years, or even three, at Chatham;

- (3) Training of Veterinary Surgeons;
- (4) Examination of Candidates for the Indian Medical Service;
- (5) Educational Establishments:—
 - (a) Royal Military Academy;
 - (b) Staff College, Camberley;
 - (c) Army Medical School;
 - (d) School of Gunnery;
 - (e) Artillery College;
 - (f) School of Engineers;
- (6) Advance of twenty-five days' pay to drafts sailing to India;
- (7) Expenses of invalids at Netley and Woolwich hospitals, and of a general Depot Establishment at Gas Port;
- (8) Expenses of men sent Home from India, either as Invalids, or time-expired men, and also those awaiting their discharge;”*

It is unnecessary to add here that, in a very short time these charges increased enormously, side by side with the gradual increase in the number of British Troops in India.

Originally, this charge was only in the form of rent. The Committee, appointed in 1861, to inquire

* *Welby Commission Report. Para 254.*

into the details of these charges found that all these charges amounted to an average of about £7 per annum per man, (between the years 1834-1857). The same Committee we may occasionally add here, gave very interesting details about the calculations on which this charge was based:—

(a) For Depot and recruiting Districts:—

- (1) Pay of men and levy money;
- (2) Staff Officers and their expenses;
- (3) Barrack accommodation;
- (4) Forage;

(b) For Regimental Agents:—

- (1) Pay of Officers, agency, etc.;
- (2) Pay of Non-Commissioned Officers and men of Regiments going or returning (to India or from India) for the period of their voyage only;
- (3) Religious Instruction;
- (4) Expenses for Hospitals and Asylums;*

About 1860, this charge was fixed at Per Capita, instead of on actual calculation, at the rate of about £7-10-0 per annum. The Welby Commission did not recommend any reduction in this charge. In 1907, however, on the recommendation of the Romar's Committee, the Capitation Charge was increased from £7-10-0, to about £11-1-0. Thus the total increase due to this changed rate came to about £3000,000 per year. This increased rate remained fairly steady till

* *Tuloch Committee Report, 1860.*

about the end of the last World War. The post-War increase in prices lead to a further increase in these rates too. It is no wonder therefore, that the Capitation Charges were practically doubled. From the 1st of April 1920, the rate came to be collected at £28-10-0 per head per annum.*

The British War Office maintains that this Capitation Rate of £28-10-0 is a fair calculation whereas the Indian Government is not certain about it. Since 1923-24, therefore, India made payments to the British War Office at the rate of £25- per head per annum.

It is curious to add here, that the British War Office is so far quite far from being inclined to fix this Capitation Charge as was suggested by the Government of India. The Indian Capitation Tribunal, appointed in 1933, to go into the details of this question has recommended certain modifications here and there but the root of the whole cause remains as it is.

Commenting on this Capitation Charge, Mr. Buchanan, a member of the Welby Commission, said in his dissenting Minute, "The £7-10-0 rate is represented as the price of recruiting and training one British Soldier at a time, when he is sent out to India, and India is made to pay the hire-charges of the British soldiers at that rate. This charge has no parallel in other parts of the British Empire."†

* *Servant of India*, 15th September, 1932.

† *Mr. Buchanan's Minute of Dissent (Welby Commission Report, 1897.)*

The opinion of the Government of India, as was put forward, was as follows:—

- (1) The cost of raising and training the recruit was very great;
- (2) The War Office, in raising this charge against India, does not make sufficient allowance for the value to England of the recruit, whether in the training of the trained recruit, or of the trained soldier, in as much as, the recruit and the soldier in the reserve, contribute to the defensive Force of United Kingdom."

According to the Tuloch Committee, the Non-Effective Charges are composed of:—*

- (1) Pensions to discharged soldiers;
- (2) Pensions to Officers wounded on service;
- (3) Charges for retired full pay or other Military allowances on retirement;
- (4) Pensions to the widows of officers and compassionate allowances to their children.

It is important to note that, India has to bear any increase in the pay, allowances, etc., of the British Troops, which is given effect to in the United Kingdom, irrespective of her financial ability or otherwise to bear these burdens. The Government of India commented as follows, "The great increases in this part of the Home Charges, (expenditure controlled by the

* *Welby Commission Report*, p. 261.

War Office) such as Capitation Charges, Non-Effective Charges, etc., for the British Forces in India, are mainly due to important changes in the organisation, or changes that have been carried out into the British Army.”*

Prior to the year 1822, all the effective charges relating to the employment of British Troops in India were borne by the Company, but none of the Non-Effective Charges. From 1822-61, a sum of £60,000 was paid annually by the East India Company to His Majesty's Government on account of Non-Effective Charges.

In 1861, instead of this lump sum, a per capita rate of £3-10-0 was imposed for the Non-Effective Services. From 1870, the then existing arrangement was replaced by a new one according to which the new capitalised value of the Indian portion of the annual pay, pensions, etc., and other incidental charges was to be paid by the Government of India to the British Exchequer.

The Welby Commission of 1897, said nothing as regards these Non-Effective Charges. They only remarked,† “The claims of the British War Office against India on account of Non-Effective Charges, are based upon the principle that India is to repay to the British Exchequer the actual cost incurred by the War Office at Home, in raising and maintaining the British Force in India.” The same Commission also side by side with the above remarks, quoted a Government of India Despatch on this subject; “If the division of

* *Government of India Despatch, No. 35, 8th February 1879.*

† *Welby Commission Report, para 253.*

expenditure between India and England is to be regarded on purely mathematical considerations or basis, and is to proceed on the assumption that the countries are partners having equal interests in respect of their joint undertaking, the Indian authorities should have an equal voice in respect of the desirability or otherwise of carrying out any proposed reforms into effect. It may be pointed out that at present, the Indian authorities have scarcely any voice at all. It has rarely if ever, happened that the Government of India had been consulted before any reforms in the organisation of the British Army have been effected, even though the execution of these reforms may have resulted in considerable burdens being thrown on Indian revenues.”*

Another Despatch of the Government of India, quoted† below, shows the situation as it was, at the time of the Welby Commission. “The revenues of India have been charged with the cost of many charges in the organisation, not especially necessary for the efficiency of the Army in this country, and also with the cost of Troops employed on Imperial Service, beyond the limits of India. Millions have been spent on increasing the Army in India, on armaments and fortifications, to provide for the security of India, not against domestic enemies, or to prevent the incursions of the warlike people of adjoining countries, but to maintain the supremacy of British Power in the East. The scope of these great and costly measures reaches far beyond the Indian limits, and the policy which dictates them is an Imperial policy. We claim, therefore,

* *Government of India Despatch, 10th August 1883.*

† *Government of India Despatch, 5th March 1888.*

that in the maintenance of the British Forces in this country, a just and even liberal view should be taken of the charges which should legitimately be made against Indian revenues."

It will be quite clear from the above that India maintains the British Troops, and not only pays all their necessary expenses, but also for their recruitment and training. Not satisfied with this, India, the good mistress that she is, also pays the proportionate pensions etc. and similar expenses.

Before discussing the pros and cons of this expenditure, it would be interesting to see what the Colonies are required to do. Mr. Buchannan, for instance says, "Not only all the Home and Civil Charges for the Colonies and other Dependencies are borne by the British Government, but large grants, (amounting to several hundreds of thousands of pounds every year) are made by the Imperial Exchequer in aid of the administration and development of these Colonies, and Dependencies. With a little exception, the whole charge of the British Troops (Effective and Non-Effective) employed outside Great Britain but *EXCLUDING* India, is uniformly borne by the British Exchequer."

Under the Military and Naval Works' Acts of recent years, an expenditure amounting to many millions, for the purposes of Imperial Defence is being made by the British Exchequer, and on British Credit at Home, and in all parts of the British Empire *EXCEPT* India. No aid has ever been given to India by the Imperial Government for the construction of similar works.

In order to justify the high charge levied upon India, various and sometimes conflicting theories are brought forward for the supposed relation of India with the Home Government. Sometimes she is treated as an independent power, at other times as in a relation of strict administrative and legislative dependence; sometimes she is spoken of as a partner in a joint concern, at other times as a more or less willing purchaser in a limited Market.”*

The majority report of the Welby Commission, however, dismissed such a view when they said,† “It is argued that the Colonies are more liberally treated than India, but here we must draw a distinction between Colonies. Malta, Gibraltar, Singapore, etc., are Imperial coaling stations or garrisons. They are essential to the United Kingdom as a great Naval Power; hence they do not enter into comparison with India. Regarding Australia, New Zealand, Canada, they have sparse populations, and the time has not yet come for calling on them to acknowledge Imperial Obligations.”

The Government of India in their Despatch in 1889, observed, “Without doubt, if we once accept the principle that the division of this charge (Non-Effective) should be made by a rateable distribution on an actual basis, the conclusion that India should pay part of pensions, etc., in exact proportion of the services which have been rendered to each, is perfectly clear. But we maintain that in practice the rateable distribution is extremely unfair to India.

* *Mr. Buchanan's Minute of Dissent, (Welby Commission Report, 1897.)*

† *Welby Commission Report, para 363.*

Speaking of the increase in the Non-Effective Charges, Mr. Cross, Secretary to the Treasury says, "Part of the increase in these charges is due to the measures carried into effect by the British Government for purposes not connected with India, such as the system of the abolition of Purchase of Commissions, and consequent grant of pensions to Officers; the compulsory retirement of Officers on attaining a certain age; the reorganisation of the Army Medical Department and other departments which by compelling India, at once to become liable to capital value of such pensions, so far as they are due for service in that country, hinders the Non-Effective Charges from falling in the manner expected when the arrangement was made." These reforms, as Mr. Cross admits, have been carried into effect by the British Government for purposes unconnected with India. The Military Requirements of India and England are so different that it is impossible that there should be any true partnership. The ultimate basis of good Government at Home is not to be sought in a strong and efficient Army, but in the patriotism and contentment of a free people."

The Government of India, as well as the people of India in general, are continuously airing their wishes against this heavy burden. According to the Welby Commission, this annual charge is possible of reduction if there is a corresponding reduction in the number of British Forces stationed in India. It is quite unnecessary to repeat that the British Forces stationed in India are more for Imperial purposes than local defence. There can hardly be two opinions on this point. Recently a new tax has been imposed, upon

the Indian revenues in the form of Unemployment Insurance, and Health Insurance, which is applicable to the British Army in India only. A few details regarding this new imposition will, it is hoped, be not out of place.

By an Act of Parliament in 1920, the Army has to pay a fixed sum for the benefit of the soldiers leaving the service, since the Army is considered as employers for the purposes of the law. Another Act in 1924, made the Army responsible for contributions to the Health Insurance and the Widows' etc. Pensions Insurance.

The above contributions in respect of British Troops in India (approximately 60,000) and which are paid directly by the Government of India are roughly as follows:—*

1. Health Insurance, at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ d. per capita per week;
2. Widows', Orphans', Old Age, etc. Pensions contribution at the rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ d. per capita per week.

The two above items bring the total contributions to about 8d. per week per soldier. In Indian Currency, this sum comes to about Rs. 270 per soldier per year or roughly about Rs. 16·32 lakhs per year for the British Troops in India. As regards Unemployment Insurance, about £80,000 are required annually, since this was the figure received by the War Office from

* *Army, Navy and Air Estimates of United Kingdom, 1926.*
p. 206.

the Government of India in respect of Unemployment Insurance for British Soldiers serving in India.

The above payments are the result of some reforms carried out in England and introduced simultaneously in India, and this too in spite of the fact that no such provision is made in respect of Indian soldiers. These payments have to be made to the British Exchequer regularly and the Government of India have no voice in it.

It has already been mentioned that several Units of the British Army are sent to various Dependencies, Colonies etc. Before the World War, British Troops used to be sent to some of the Self-Governing Dominions as well, but since then the Dominions have begun maintaining their own Forces.

In return for the service these Dependencies or Colonies get, the British War Office receives payments of money from these countries, which are termed *Appropriations-in-Aid*. The following table gives the amounts of the Appropriations for four years from 1927-28 to 1930-31:—(The figures are in thousands of pounds sterling).

Country	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31
Contributions by the Indian Government	1,400	1,400	1,600	1,600
Colonial Contributions, CYPRUS	10	10	10
Mauritius	55	61	60	55
Ceylon	84	83	85	85
Straits Settlements	592	430	440	498
Hong Kong	320	389	400	387
Contributions from the Government of Egypt for the maintenance of British Troops	Figures not available			

The following explanations are given as regards these Appropriations:—

1. India; Non-Effective Charges:—India makes a payment at an annual rate of (£11-8-0 before the World War) per head of the establishment of the British Army in India, in respect of the cost of training and raising the Officers and men in this country. The sum taken in 1925, was based on an increase over the pre-war rate. The increased sums taken for 1926, brings into account certain additional charges incurred in training, not covered by the provisions in 1925. The revision of the rate is still under consideration.

2. Colonial Contributions:—The amounts paid by these Colonies are fixed as follows:—

MAURITIUS:—5 per cent. of the Colony's assessible income or revenue;

CEYLON:— $\frac{1}{3}$ ths of the total cost of garrison or $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the assessible income or revenue, whichever is less;

STRAITS SETTLEMENTS:—The total cost of the garrison or 20 per cent. of the assessible income or revenue, whichever is less;

HONG KONG:—The total cost of the garrison or 20 per cent. of the income or revenue assessible, whichever is less;

3. Contributions from the Government of Egypt towards the cost of the maintenance of British Troops in Egypt:—

“The payment of £150,000 was fixed annually in 1907.”

It is worth noting here that, as regards the Colonies and dependencies, *except* India, the contribution to the War Office is expressly stated to be "for the maintenance of the Regular Troops which in other words means only the Effective Cost. On the other hand, the contributions from India, as is again expressly stated, in the Army, Navy and Air Estimates of Great Britain for the year 1926, is for the raising and training of British Officers and men serving in India." This is a further-proof, if any proof is needed, of the treatment accorded to India by Great Britain, the country who won and has maintained Britain's vast (prestige) Empire beyond the seas. Considering the invaluable training the British Troops in India receive, and the employment obtained for such a large number of the British working class, it would not be asking more than is due, if India, not only should be spared the payment of the Capitation Charges, but that Parliament should make a nice annual contribution towards the upkeep of the British Troops in India.

CHAPTER VI

RECRUITING

“It depends entirely upon Military Policy, whether reliance is placed upon voluntary service with the reserved right of drafts in case of emergency, or whether a labour-tax is imposed upon a people for the support of a permanent standing Army.”*

We discussed the position of Military Expenditure in India along with that of some other countries, in relation to their general total expenditure, and came to the conclusion that armed forces are essential, but at the same time the necessity of reducing the Army Budget is equally pressing. It is intended here to discuss, the system in vogue in other countries, and to see whether it can be of any use to India in reducing the crushing burden of her Military Expenditure.

Upto now Indians were well nigh excluded from considering any question relating to the Army, and hence Great Britain's was the only example to follow before some of us. It is but natural, therefore, that many of us should come to regard the English system of Volunteers, as the most conducive to our needs and welfare. Its championship by England, is also natural, since that country is also the champion of the doctrine called “*Laissez Faire*”; and as such would never cherish the idea of compulsion, whether physical or moral, political or economic. Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside, says, “The organisation of the British

* *Science of Public Finance*—Prof. Adams. pp. 18-19.

Army is peculiar to the British Empire and in consequence, few foreigners, have been able to estimate its true value, differing as it does so completely from Conscript Armies."

Discussing the same subject, the same author further observes, "The men composing the British Army are highly paid, because they can be only obtained in competition with the labour market." Englishmen may afford to pay for their defence, because they bear a traditional dislike for any compulsion in any form. Had there been more than enough labourers in England, the Iron Law of Wages would have automatically come into operation, and supply being greater than demand, wages would have been lowered. As wages are comparatively high, it follows that the demand is greater than the supply which then results in the paucity of men. Now-a-days, so much is heard about the unemployment problem in England and the efforts of the British Government to give relief to the unemployed, that it may be possible to predict that England may find it profitable to introduce conscription! But such a day is still to come. In the meanwhile it is interesting to know that men like Mr. Julian Grande prophesy the introduction of Conscription in England. Another factor which overweighs the introduction of Conscription in England is the ability of the English people to pay for any increase in the Defence Services of their country. If they were not able to pay the increased taxes there would have been a hue and cry against it. In that case perhaps, the system of recruiting in England might have undergone a change. As is well known, the English people are

very practical, and they do not mind to throw overboard their long-cherished theories, the moment they begin to realise the disadvantages arising out of them.

In Germany, on the other hand, the poverty of the people coupled with the necessity of having a large Army resulted in the imposition of Labour-Tax, in the shape of Compulsory Military Service. In Germany, the supply of labour available was much more than the demand. Hence, Conscription was regarded as the only way to get out of the difficulty. Mr. Julian Grande, observes, "The Swiss Army System, in its broad general conceptions, is exceedingly simple; being based on the principle that it would be the pride and the duty of every citizen to help in the Defence of his country." With regard to France it is said, "One of the principles on which the present Republic of France is constituted is that *Every Able-bodied Citizen is a Soldier*".

Without dilating further on this subject, it is sufficient to say that the compulsion with regard to National Defence is the direct outcome of the changing methods of warfare since the middle of the last century. As one authority says, "The battle of Short Service (a preliminary to Compulsory Military Service) was fought on the grounds of numbers alone. One of the most important advantages of Universal Service is that, Universal Service, for the good of the country has this result, that the Army is composed not of the mere waifs and strays of humanity, not of recruits driven into service by sheer lack of bread; but of the whole manhood of the nation, including its best men of every rank and every stage or physical and mental development, except the lowest."

Another Military authority in England, favouring Compulsory Military Service says, "The history of evolution of modern Armies proves conclusively that no limitation of existing Forces is conceivable, either with due regard to national economy or for the stability of the present constitution." He further adds, "The national wealth and credit depends upon the training of every man, physically worth the time of the Instructor, and the one bulwark against Socialism upon which the German Government relies is constituted by the excess of ex-Soldiers over the civilians in the voting population."

NUMBERS are the criterion of the Armies of to-day. Modern warfare is tending more and more to be a National concern, involving practically the entire population of the country, instead of the old method—a concern of two opposing armies only. This idea was first brought home by that famous British soldier, Lord Roberts in his pet phrase, "NATION-IN-ARMS." It attracted so much attention, that even now there is, in England, a very strong and influential group of leaders—though in a minority—which is of opinion that England should discard her old and worn-out policy of Voluntary Recruiting and go over to Conscription. Mr. Julian Grande, the Author of the Swiss System, writing in his book, published just after the War, predicted that England, the Citadel of "*Laissez Faire*" in Defence matters, is bound to go over to Conscription sooner or later. Looking to the efforts made in England to popularise Military Training among all classes of the society, one begins to wonder whether there is any difference between the Continental System of Compulsion and the British System of Voluntary

Training and Recruiting. In England, the idea of Voluntary Training is twisted in such a way that the same results as Conscription are achieved. In this way, theoretically, England may have been favouring Voluntary Training, though for all Practical purposes she has adopted quite the reverse of Voluntarianism.

Another advantage resulting from Compulsory Military Training is that the authorities get a variety of recruits in Physique, Training, Education, Intellect, etc., etc., all of which are of the utmost advantage to the NATION! Last, but not the least benefit, Compulsion confers from the Financial point of view, is that it lowers the cost of Defence. Compulsion thus gives the maximum of returns for the minimum of expenditure. Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside, as has been seen above, plainly admits that the British Army recruited on a Voluntary Basis, is costlier than the Continental Armies recruited under Compulsory Military Training. According to Prof. Adams, Voluntary Recruiting imposes on a people a direct-tax while Compulsory Recruiting imposes on the same people an indirect-tax.

The direct tax referred to above, is in the shape of money for increased Defence expenditure. The indirect tax, on the contrary is in the shape of a labour-tax. This means that the people are given the choice of paying this particular kind of tax, either in money or in kind. Such a payment of Government dues in cash or kind, was very common in India, till the advent of the British rule here. Since then, however, money payments have become the order of the day. This money economy in place of kind

economy, is very hard and unsuitable to an economically backward country like India, more especially since the ability of the people to bear the extra burdens has reached the highest limit.

There is another reason also, which will have to be considered. It is one of the established and uncontrovertible facts in taxation that an indirect tax is more beneficial and advisable than the direct tax. After discussing the question of a Labour-Tax, Professor Adams significantly concludes, "From an economic point of view there is little question that the Labour-Tax as practised in Germany rests more heavily upon the industries of the people than a corresponding Money-Tax. It is equally certain, that considerations of Military Efficiency would lead to an acceptance of the German System."

The economic history of Germany before 1870, shows that Germany found herself in the same circumstances as present-day India. Feudalism was rampant in Germany, and there were only two classes in the society, the rich and the poor. The rich people were the self-styled leaders of the general masses, and hence because of sheer selfish motives, the burden of taxation fell upon the poor. There was grinding poverty among the masses, side by side with a virtual absence of any industries on a large scale. Unemployment was also common. Under such circumstances, the German Government had to reform and to organise their country's defence system. In order, therefore, to bring this about, they introduced the system of Compulsory Military Service in their country—Germany. This system proved to be advantageous to all alike, both to the Government as well as to the

people.* Says Colonel Maude, "In Germany, most of the elementary teachers came from the Army, and there seems nothing but prejudice to prevent our adopting a similar plan for us, for now a days, we get as soldiers, very many men more intellectually fit for these posts." The same author very graphically pointed out the value of men, who have undergone Compulsory Military Training, to the agriculturists, the Farmers, the industrialists, the factory owners, in fact practically to every employer of labour. The German industrialists supported the Government in introducing Compulsory Military Training, since they thought that such a system would be beneficial to the country, as well as to themselves as a class. Owing to the introduction of this system they hoped, and they really did get, trained and efficient men as workmen. This was one of the greatest advantages to the prosperity of the Infant Industries of Germany. They could also get cheaply, this trained and efficient labour, as there was unemployment in the country.

The third advantage from Compulsory Military training is that it reduces costs. We have already cited the views of Major-General Ironside. In Voluntary Recruiting, Government is bound to pay to the recruits the terms demanded by them. The Government in such cases, cannot by law, force anybody to serve in the Army on its own terms. Hence the recruits are in an advantageous position and thus demand more pay than they would get elsewhere. With Compulsory Military Service, on the otherhand, the Government, by Law, can force anybody and everybody to join the Army, and as such the

* *War and World's Life—Colonel Maude. p. 246.*

Government is in an advantageous position. It can therefore, dictate its own terms to the recruits who have no other choice but accept the same. This difference of pay, between Voluntary and Compulsory Recruits goes a long way to raise or to lower the total expenditure on Defence. It is apparent, therefore, that the system of recruiting is a determining factor in the total defence expenditure of the Army in a country.

A further advantage from Compulsory Military Service is that it brings about a profound change in the social relations of the people of a country. As has been seen earlier, where there is Voluntary system, such as is in vogue in England, Military Authorities complain about the inferior calibre of those who are willing to enlist. Even before the last World War, the same thing must have happened. While suggesting Compulsory Military Service for Great Britain, Colonel Maude observes,* "Compulsion would enable us to select the physical pick of the nation, which is precisely the portion which does not want to serve." In every country, whether civilised or backward, the position appears to be something like this: where the material is excellent, the conditions under which the men would be required to serve are comparatively less attractive; on the otherhand, where the conditions for service are attractive, the material available is much below the mark. Such a disadvantage can only be mended by the Introduction of Conscription.

Compulsory Military Service builds character and many other essential qualities which ultimately produce good soldier-citizens. It is hardly necessary

* *War and World's Life*—Colonel Maude p. 278.

to furnish any proof to this statement: this is a universal truth. Mr. Gotaro Ogawa, reviewing the situation in Japan observes, "There is no doubt that the influence of Conscription even upon economic conditions is a very great and important subject." He also goes on to say how Conscription beneficially affects the *DEATH-RATE*, the *BIRTH-RATE*, *EFFICIENCY OF LABOUR*, *AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT*, etc., when he says, "The Army is a National School, so to speak. Remarkable is the effect of Army life for a period of two or three years under training, upon the improvement of the character of the people. There can be no doubt that Military Life as a whole, has some effect upon the efficiency of the labourers."*

Can we compare these conditions in foreign countries with those prevalent in India? There are no two opinions that the recruitment for the Indian Army is confined only to a part of the country and not the whole. Soldiers are illiterate, devoid of any national sense, and with the past traditions to serve those who would pay them highest. Authorities, including some of the former Field-M Marshals and also some of the former Commanders-in-Chief concur in holding that the present Indian Army is a Mercenary Force. There is no wonder, therefore, that there is hardly any Military activity amongst the educated classes. Not only that; on the contrary, these educated classes appear, superficially at least, to be looking down upon the soldiers as a class. Government officials in India and Military officials in particular, have specialised in broadcasting about the diversity of races, Martial and Non-Martial qualities amongst the Indians, etc., to the

* *Conscription System in Japan—Gotaro Ogawa. pp. 136-37.*

foreigners, with the result that a very large majority of India's large population, is for all practical purposes, debarred from entering the Army. The list appended at the end of this chapter would go a long way in explaining how recruiting in India is restricted only to a few classes. The latest champion of this principle of Martial and Non-Martial differences is the report of the Simon Commission, which includes the following;* "In contrast with the Self-Governing Dominions, and indeed, in contrast with almost all countries of the world, India presents to the observer an astounding admixture, not only of competing religions and rival races, but races of widely different Military capacity. Really speaking, one may say that those races which furnish the best sepoys are emphatically not those which exhibit the greater accomplishment of mind in an examination. The contrast between areas and races in India that take to soldiering and those that do not, have no counterpart in Europe. Whereas, the most virile of the so-called Martial races provide fine fighting material, other communities and areas in India do not furnish a single man to the Regular Army. It seems certain that in the future equal efficiency in the Military sense, such as is necessary, in view of the severe tasks which the Army in India has to perform, and in view of the urgent need of reduced Military Expenditure, cannot be expected from all the sections of the population of India. As things are, the presence of the British Troops and the leadership of British Officers secure that the fighting regiments in India, though representing a portion of India's manhood, shall not be a

* *Simon Commission Report, 1930. Vol. I. pp.96-98.*

menace to millions who are conducting their civil occupations without any thought or consequence which might ensue, if the British Troops were withdrawn and the Indian consisted of nothing but representatives of the Indian Fighting Races." This report is enough proof of how firm and deep the idea of Martial and Non-Martial classes has been ingeniously allowed to permeate during the last hundred years or so. The theory that the people of India, with the possible exception of a small number of selected tribes and castes, from specified regions are unfit for any kind of Military Service, took gradual shape in the slow-working brains of the British Military Authorities in India after especially the great catastrophe of the Mutiny which destroyed the old Army, and forced upon them the necessity of creating a new and a reliable Army from the population of the Punjab and the regions adjacent to it. From the distinction that is made between Martial and Non-Martial classes, it would appear that important criterion of a good soldier is the physical qualities he possesses and as such, soldiers in 'India have necessarily been recruited from among the physically fit or the so-called warlike races in India, namely the Gurkhas, the Sikhs, and the Punjabis, as also the Frontier Mahomadens.' In his article in the *Modern Review*, Mr. Chaudhari observes, "Not only is the Indian Army recruited from a limited number of carefully selected clans from specified regions, but its whole organisation is based upon a caste-system more rigid than the Hindu Society. The Indian Army does not recognise the individual."*

* *Modern Review*, July 1930. Article by Mr. N. C. Chaudhari.

This process of recruitment has resulted, according to various high Military Authorities in making the Indian Army a *FIGHTING MACHINE*, able to stand up to any European Army. Hence it is that we hear that the Indian Army is something different from any of the modern armies.

The reasoning about the Physical Qualities being essential in a soldier, as also its importance in the training and the recruitment, appears to be a miscalculation. The 'Field Service Regulations' which is regarded as the BIBLE of the soldier, lays down the following as a maxim; "*SUCCESS IN WAR DEPENDS MORE UPON MORAL THAN UPON PHYSICAL QUALITIES. NEITHER NUMBERS, ARMAMENTS, RESOURCES, NOR SKILL CAN COMPENSATE FOR LACK OF COURAGE, DETERMINATION, AND THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT THAT SPRINGS FROM A NATIONAL DETERMINATION TO CONQUER.*"*

The above important quotation lends a clue as to the future requirements of India. Up to now, the Army has been wholly Mercenary in nature, being composed to a large extent, of foreigners, that is of people devoid of any nationalism. The only quality which facilitates their entry into the present Indian Army is implicit obedience to the orders of their superiors. This has always been the case in the past as well as in the present. The object of any future reconstruction or reorganisation would necessarily be to replace this mercenary spirit by a national one. The policy and the spirit of the composition of the Indian Army and its functions must also undergo a

* *Field Service Regulations. Vol. II, Sec. I. Para 2.*

change. The first essential to bring out this change would be to stop all recruitment in future of those races and people who are termed *Foreigners*, namely, the Gurkhas from Nepal, the Trans-Border Pathans, etc.

The second thing required would be to inculcate martial spirit in the peoples of India in general. It is argued that difficulties would arise in making the Indian Army completely national, owing to the preponderance of the *Babu* class in India. The Simon Commission Report, which has been already referred to elsewhere, raises this bug-bear. It will not be out of place, therefore, to examine the statement so ably put forth in the Simon Commission Report. Two points stand out quite clearly: (1) In India there are a handful of Martial Races, while those comprising the *Babu* class can be measured in thousands and even by tens of thousands; (2) In contrast with European conditions, in India it is difficult to think of anything like a *Levy en Masse*.

The East India Company's Army in India, before the Mutiny, consisting of almost all classes and races—some of which, however, are non-existent to-day,—was very highly spoken of by the then Military Officers. Lord Ellenborough, for instance, a former Governor-General of India, giving evidence before the Peel Committee, said, "It is distressing to think that we must abandon the hope of ever seeing a native Army composed like that we have lost. It was an Army, which under a general it loved and trusted, would have marched victorious to the Dardanelles".*

* *Appendices to the Peel Committee Report, p. 6.*

Homogeneity and Brotherhood were the two qualities which brought laurels of praise to the old Indian Army from such high officials in the pre-Mutiny days. But soon, these very qualities began to appear to the same officials in India as defects. Sir John Lawrence, for instance, the then Commissioner of Punjab, says,* "Among the defects (In the pre-Mutiny Army) unquestionably the worst, and one *which operated most fatally against us*, was the brotherhood and homogeneity of the Bengal Army; and for this peculiar defect the remedy is a counterpoise; *first* the great counterpoise of the Europeans, and the *Second*, that of the various Native races. Had the old Bengal Army had all these remedies applied to it ten years ago, it would doubtless have been a much better Army." This is why, perhaps, soon after the Mutiny, there was a thorough overhauling and reorganisation of the past policy and working, and as Sir John Lawrence pointed out, the two great counterpoises were created.

The Peel Committee, appointed in 1859, to suggest proposals for the reorganisation of the Indian Army, examined many high and distinguished officials, both civil and military, and they were all unanimously in favour of discontinuing the past policy of homogeneity and brotherhood in the Indian Army. One of the witnesses, General Mansfield, for instance, observed,† "Uniformity in these respects is neither desirable nor advisable. The more diversity that can be introduced in the constitution of the different Corps, the better;

* *Appendices to the Peel Committee Report*, p. 19.

† *Ibid.* p. 63.

so that, in case of any future combination, the heterogeneous character of the various regiments may present an effective check or ban to it." Lord Clyde, another witness before the same Committee gave it as his considered opinion that Uniformity in "Such" matters was *DANGEROUS*!*

The solution suggested to introduce these Heterogeneous Elements in the Indian Army, in place of the "undesirable" and "inadvisable" Homogeneity, was as Colonel Burn said,* "There has always been great jealousy between the Oudh and the Bihar men, and I see that it was taken advantage of at Lahore, during the Mutiny, when the Bihar men were separated from those of Oudh." In the same light, General Mansfield, giving his considered opinion about the Sikhs, said,† "It was not because they *loved us*, but because they hated Hindustan and the Bengal Army that they flocked to our standard instead of seeking the opportunity to attain their freedom. They wanted to revenge themselves and to gain riches by plunder of Hindustani cities. They were not attracted by mere daily pay; it was rather the prospects of wholesale plunder and stamping on the heads of their enemies. In short, we turned to profit by the *ESPRIT DE CORPS*, which for a time most effectively bound the Sikhs to Us, as long as the activities against their old enemies would last."

It was on the strength of these authorities, that the Peel Committee finally reported as follows:—"The Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule mixed

* *Appendices to the Peel Committee Report*, p. 157.

† *Ibid.* p. 97.

promiscuously through each Regiment, the reason being that at the present time, the Sikh and the Poorbiah, the Mussalman of the Punjab and Oudh, serve side by side in all parts of the vast and ill-defined tracts called the Bengal Presidency, a term which has not even the accuracy of a geographical division. The natural consequences are that the distinctive characteristics of the soldiers, both in creed and in nationality tend to amalgamate, and thus a common feeling is stimulated which might dangerously unite them to a common end.”*

As a result of these recommendations, a new system was introduced, which has been aptly described by the biographer of Lord Kitchner as follows: “The Government, mindful of the lessons taught by the Mutiny, was alive to the danger of allowing any one element in the Indian Army to preponderate unduly. An increase in the Punjabi Regiment had, as its necessary sequel, the recruitment of the valuable Gurkha material and the enlistment of the more trans-border Pathans in the Frontier Militia.”†

When the Simla Army Commission—also known as the Eden Committee—of 1878 reviewed the working of these *New* reforms, Sir Richard Temple, the then Governor of Bombay, observed,‡ “In India under the British rule, the former martial tendencies of the native population gradually became lessened, till they almost disappeared, and this circumstance is regarded to be one of the safeguards of our rule. So conscious

* *Peel Committee Report*, Para 47.

† *Life of Lord Kitchner*. Vol. II. p. 126.

‡ *Appendices to Eden Committee Report*, p. 181.

has the Government been of this, that within the present generation, the Native population has been disarmed, that is, the people have been enjoined to give up their arms. The Government never passed its Indian subjects through the ranks, nor sent them to their homes, in the vigour of life. On the contrary, it has, heretofore, never parted with its Indian soldiers till they were pensioned in the evening of their life. Therefore, to train them, to keep them for a limited time, either with the Colours or with the Reserves, and then altogether to discharge them without a pension, to their homes, in numbers increasingly large, would be to endure a constant influx into the civil population of military men no longer bound to Government, and to infuse again, into the people, a part of that Martial spirit, which has been disappearing, and the disappearance of which is still advantageous to Us."

Lieutenant-General Warre, similarly observed, "The chief difficulty in India consists in disposing of the Reserves, during peace, so that an indefinite number of trained soldiers shall not be thrown on Native villages, or scattered throughout the agricultural districts, thereby inculcating an undesirable military spirit amongst the now quiet and naturally non-Military population".*

With such evidence before them, it was natural for the Eden Committee to pronounce its opinion in the following terms: "There can be little doubt that the maintenance of the Army Reserve in India, would greatly increase the offensive and the defensive power

* *Appendices to Eden Committee Report, p. 184.*

of the Indian Army. At the same time, however, it must be remembered that our Native Army is a Mercenary Force, serving an alien Government. It would be practically inadvisable to adopt for India the Short Service System of Europe, whereby the largest possible number of men are passed through the Army, returned into the general population, and are kept, by periodical training, in a state of Military efficiency.”*

Mr. Arbuthnot, a member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, expressed the British civilian and also the Military point of view, by saying as follows;† “The Native Army of India is the only large Army of the world which is entirely composed of Mercenary Troops, alien in race to the rulers of the country, and under these circumstances it may well be doubted whether the system of Army Reserves, which in recent years, has been introduced into the Armies of European States, is applicable to the Native Army in India.” It appears, however, that some people had doubts about the Eden Committee observations, and in a Minute of Dissent Sir E. B. Johnson said,‡ “In European countries the object is to have as many trained people to arms as possible, in India the object should be exactly the reverse.”

The Eden Committee, however, admitted the importance of the Reserve System, since they observed, “The want of some system of Reserves has often been felt. The success of the German system has shown that the existence of Army Reserves gives an immense,

* *Eden Committee Report, para. 259.*

† *Mr. Arbuthnot's Minute of Dissent, Government of India Despatch, No. 158, 16th June 1879.*

‡ *Eden Committee Report, para. 258.*

and at the same time, an economical increase in the Military Power of the Nation"*

The table below shows the composition of the Indian Army, including the present percentage composition of the various classes both in the Infantry as well as in the Cavalry:—

Serial No.	Class	District	% in Infantry ex Gurkhas	% in Infantry in Gurkhas	% in Cavalry
1	Punjabi Mussalman...	Punjab ...	27	22.6	14.28
2	Gurkhas	... Nepal	16.4	...
3	Sikhs	... Punjab ...	16.24	13.58	23.81
4	Dogras	... North Punjab & Kashmir ...	11.4	9.54	9.53
5	Jats	... Rajputana, U.P. & Punjab ..	9.5	7.94	19.06
6	Pathans	... N. W. F. P. ...	7.57	6.35	4.76
7	Marathas	... Konkan ...	5.34	5.33	...
8	Gahrwalis	... Gahrwal ...	4.53	3.63	...
9	U. P. Rajputs...	Rajputana ...	3.64	2.56	4.76
10	Rajputana Rajputs	... Rajputana ...	2.8	2.36	4.75
11	Kumaonis	... Kumaon ...	2.44	2.05	...
12	Hujars	... N.E. Rajputana	1.52	1.28	...
13	Punjabi Hindus	Punjab ...	1.52	1.28	...
14	Ahirs	... Punjab ...	4.22	1.024	...
15	Rajput Musalmans (Ranholders)	Dehli and its neighbourhood	1.22	1.024	...

* *Eden Committee Report, Para 253.*

Serial No.	Class	District	% in Infantry ex Gurkhas	% in Infantry in Gurkhas	% in Cavalry
16	Rajput Mussalmans (Kaimkhanis) ...	Rajputana	4.26
17	Kachins ...	Burmah ...	1.22	1.024	...
18	Chins ...	Burmah ...	1.22	1.024	...
19	Karens ...	Burmah ...	1.22	1.024	...
20	Deccani Mussalmans ...	Deccan	4.76
21	Hindustani Mussalmans (Mainly from U.P.)	2.38

The above* table is enough proof of the fact that the bulwarks of the present-day Army in India are the Punjab Mussalmans, the Gurkhas, the Sikhs, and the Dogras. It is strange, however, to find that according to the exigencies of circumstances, this composition too is liable to change. The following table, for instance, gives the approximate proportion of soldiers furnished to the Indian Army by the different parts of the country, such as the Punjab, the Deccan, Nepal, etc., during the years mentioned against each:—

* *Modern Review*, July 1930.

THE FIGURES ARE THE PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL.

Serial No.	Part of the Country	1856	1858	1883	1893	1905	1919	1930
1	Punjab, N.W.F.P. Kashmir.	less than 10	47	48	88	47	46	58.5
2	Nepal, Gahrwal, and Kumaon.	less than 1	6	27	25	15	14.8	22
3	Northern India, Ex. 1 and 2 Categories.	not less than 90	47	35	25	22	25.6	22
4	South India.	Negligible	18	12	5.5
5	Burmah.	Nil	1.7	3

The above* figures need no comment. With the operation of the policy of Counterpoise, it is but natural that none of the above classes have been or will be allowed to preponderate. The initial step towards this end was the introduction of the theory of Class Composition. This theory meant the organisation of regiments according to class and race distinctions of the soldiers. But even this was not found to be sufficient check, and hence under the Kitchner regime, a further step was taken whereby, the name of each regiment was kept intact, but the composition of the same came to be mixed. Under this scheme, each Company was formed of a particular race or class. Hence, whenever, Military Authorities thought it necessary to exclude a particular class or race, that particular race or class at once became an eye-sore to the various recruiting authorities, and gradually their place was taken up by an entirely new type or race

* *Article Modern Review, July 1930.*

† *Ibid. September 1930.*

of people. Before the Mutiny, for instance, the percentage of the Hindustani soldiers from Northern India in the Indian Army was nothing less than 90 per cent. Since then, however, their percentage began to come down, with the result that in 1893, it was only 23 per cent. It continued to fall down from that time onwards, so that now it is a meagre 11 per cent. With this gradual fall in the recruitment of the Northern India Men or the Hindustanis as they were called in those days, the percentage of the people from the the Punjab, the N. W. F. P., Kashmir, the Kumaon District, the Gharwal and Nepal began to rise correspondingly. Before the Mutiny, for instance, the percentage of these people was *NEGLIGIBLE*. Since 1858, however, their percentage shows an upward tendency, so that to-day it is something like 58·6 per cent.

One authority after another have expressed themselves in favour of this Mixed-Composition, which means playing upon the racial prejudices or jealousies, religious differences, antagonisms and the like, of the various classes of soldiers in the Indian Army and this too *for the safety of India!* As 'long as this policy remains in force, India should not think of defending herself, for according to the biographer of Lord Rawlinson, "When India has got rid of her racial feuds, her religious animosities, and eastern prejudices, and is inspired by one dominating idea of patriotism, she can begin to think of defending herself."*

Enough evidence has been provided to show that all Military authorities have pronounced against the

* *Life of Lord Rawlinson—Maurice.* p. 341.

formation of Reserves. The one great bug-bear these people entertain is the fear of a repetition of the 1858 events. It automatically nullifies the arguments advanced at other times, about the preponderance of the Babu class in India, as regards Indians in general. The report of the Mesopotamian Commission on the Indian Army observes,* "The Regulation applicable to the Indian Troops require men to serve for 25 years for a pension. Such a system means that there are a large number of men in the ranks who would be entirely unfit for the rigours of active service. We do not hesitate to say that the Indian Reserves' system entirely broke down under the stress of War Conditions." Whatever system of Reserves there was, the same Commission, in their report, criticised it wholesale when they observed, "The Reserve system of the Native Army (Rank and File) seems to have been well adapted to foster loyalty of Military pensioners, but the old men who returned to the colours were unsuitable as soldiers; a Reserve system should be concerned principally with efficiency."

The report not only criticised the policy underlying the Military administration of India, but also praised the fighting qualities of the Indian Troops in the following words,† "Our investigations show that what is at fault is not the fighting capacity and efficiency of the Indian Troops, or the Combatant Forces of the Indian Army, but the system of Military Administration in control of that Army."

* *Report, Mesopotamian Commission 1917. Para 14.*

† *Ibid. Minute of Dissent by Commander Wedgwood. Part III, Para 26.*

In spite of such criticisms, there are still champions to put efficiency in the background for the sake of POLICY. Mr. Stephen King-Hall, for instance, says,* "The French theory that tends to base the Defences of the French Empire upon the coloured Troops in an increasing degree, is not one which can be recommended to the British Empire (India)."

The Mesopotamian Commission report poo-pooed the Indian Army, and more particularly the policy of the Government as regards the Army Reserves. What they required was a uniformly young Army and not mere pensioners. Von der Goltz, a well known German Military Authority says, "Our Military System keeps the soldiers in the Field Army until about the thirtieth year. A young Field Army, particularly one, uniformly young, is greatly superior to any other."

There is little hope for the present, at least. The outstanding prejudice regarding the Indians, in the minds of the British Officials in this country, is not extinct in spite of their admission that with the changed circumstances, times and outlook, their policy also would change. The Auxiliary and the Territorial Forces Committee considered that, "The growth of the National Military spirit should not be forced by any application of Compulsion." This again proves that the Government of India have not, as yet realised the wisdom of the words of Von der Goltz, "To-day it is not sufficient, as Machiavelli proposed, that rulers alone should know war; the Nations themselves no less need this knowledge."

To conclude, therefore, the greatest need of India, both of to-day as well as tomorrow, is ***VOLUNTEERS.***

* *Imperial Defence—Stephen King-Hall p. 52.*

The Government should cast off their old prejudices, and boldly face the problem. Since the last ten years or so, India is rapidly making headway with Western Institutions, and as such, everything that tends to expedite this Westernisation of political thought, is worth adopting. "The Volunteers are to the Army what the Opposition is or should be to a Government;* for they are free to speak and to criticise, and without their criticism we should, like every other Army, drop back into self complacency and a blind worship of the Regulations."

It was left for the late Hon. G. K. Gokhale, to point out to the Government the dissatisfaction among the educated classes, that recruitment in India is confined more and more to Frontier and Trans-Frontier men, to the people of Non-Indian or Extra-Indian areas, with the result that the Army is approximating more and more completely to a Mercenary force." He correctly voiced the sentiments of the then advanced Indian leaders, when he said in 1903, "At the present moment India is the only country in the civilised world where the people are debarred from the privileges of citizenship, and from voluntary participation in the responsibilities of National Defence."

When the World War broke out and India plunged into it, heart and soul, on behalf of the Allies, the efforts and the valuable help rendered by the Indians during the anxious years 1914-18, went a long way to change, some at least, of the many prejudices which the British people had about Indians and India. The most outstanding example was the famous declaration of August 1917.

* *War & World's Life*—Colonel Maude p. 76.

The question of the reorganisation of the Indian Army, which had been specially referred to the Easher Committee, came up before the Legislative Assembly, which was then the newly elected and reformed body. Sir P. S. Shivaswami Aiyar, an authority on Indian Defence matters, moved a series of about 15 resolutions, the tenth resolution out of those fifteen being as follows: "This Assembly recommends to the Governor-General-in-Council, that in view of the need to undertake the burden of Defence of India, and in the interests of Economy it is essential that a serious effort should be made to, (a) organise and to encourage the formation of an adequate Territorial Force on attractive conditions; (b) Introduce into the Indian Army a system of Short Colour Service." The Government at that time, accepted this resolution, but have not found it necessary, so far, to take it out of Cold Storage!

The idea of the Territorial divisions of the Army, has been well expounded by Von der Goltz, "Seeing that the national Military System affects all the relations of social life, and continuously demands the mutual co-operation of the civil and Military authorities; it follows that it is best that the division of the Army should be adapted to the civil, or in ordinary language, the political divisions of the Country or State." A beginning to introduce this Territorial spirit in the Indian Army has been made on a miniature scale, so that some Provincial Battalions have been formed. Considering the vastness of the Indian Army, there cannot be any satisfaction unless and until any head-way is made in the Regular Forces as well.

Sir Edmund Ironside, lucidly explains the organisation, working and ideals of the Territorial Army in Great Britain, when he says,* "In Great Britain, it has been decided that the Territorial Army shall form the method of expansion of the Regular Army. The Territorial Army is organised by Counties, and it is of the utmost importance to maintain this spirit both in peace and in war. It is a most important factor in the maintenance of *MORALE* in the field, and connects directly, the people at Home with the Fighting men on the Front."

To make the Indian Army efficient and organise it on the latest lines, the employment of soldiers should not be limited to a particular class of people only. Literacy should be the main criterion. As Sir Edmund Ironside says,† "*It is the educated classes or brain which will best stand the strain of war, and the Regular Army in Great Britain insists upon a high educational standard.*"

* *Study of War*—Sir Edmund Ironside, pp. 128-29.

† *Ibid.* p. 127.

CHAPTER VII

INDIANISATION

Since the publication of the report of the Skeen Committee, Indianisation has become one of the burning topics of the day. As the biographer of Lord Kitchner writes,* "As long ago as 1885, the Military Member, Sir George Chesney, and the then Commander-in-Chief Lord Roberts, had expressed diametrically opposite views on the question of Indianisation; Chesney maintaining that, the Indian Army suffered from the exclusion of Indians from the higher Commands, while Roberts grounded his objection to that proposal on the strong feeling inveterate to all ranks of the British Army that Indians are neither physically nor morally their equals."

The very question of the Indianisation of the Indian Army presupposes that there are some elements which are non-Indian, in the Indian Army of to-day. It has already been seen that there is a considerable force of British Units in India. It has also been proved that in the Indian Army, proper, some classes of recruits, who are not of an Indian nationality, are enlisted continually. So also, almost all King's Commissions in the Indian Army, leave aside the British Army for the moment, are *almost* the monopoly of the British people. Naturally, on the face of these things, the meaning of the word Indianisation of the Officers' Ranks, as well as the Indianisation of the Army in

* *Life of Lord Kitchner*—Sir George Arthur, p. 176.

India as a whole, means Indianisation not only of the Officers' Ranks but also of the Rank and File of the Army. The latter word is also referred to as the substitution of the British Units in the Indian Army by Indian Units. Sir Phiroze Sethna, speaking before the Defence Sub-Committee, of the First Round Table, observed,* "Indianisation, as observed by the Chairman (Right Honourable Mr. J. H. Thomas) means both; introducing Indian Officers in place of British Officers,—in the Indian Units at least—as also, replacing of British Units by Indian Units."

It has been already suggested that recruiting of Trans-border Pathans, the Nepali Gurkhas, and the other Non-Indian elements, should be stopped. This demand for Indianisation naturally originated with the top-heavy expenditure. The annual report of the Director of Public Information with the Government of India, says,† "One of the contributory causes for the demand for rapid Indianisation, is to be found in the present cost of India's Defence—Military Defence." This question of cost is vividly brought home when it is seen that the cost of every English soldier is something like four to five times as heavy as an average Indian soldier. Sir Muhammad Shafi, speaking before the Defence Sub-Committee, observed, "The cost of the British soldier in India is equal to the expenditure on from four to five Indian soldiers."

Before discussing the replacement of the British Units by the Indian Units, it will be better to consider the Indianisation of the Officer-Ranks of the Indian

* *Proceedings of Defence Sub-Committee of the R.T.C. p. 303.*

† *India in 1926-27. p. 269.*

Army. It is interesting to note in this connection, that the Native Regiments of the former East India Company were officered and commanded by Indian gentlemen of high rank and birth. Sir Malcolm Seton says,* "It is interesting to note that the earlier Sepoy Battalions were commanded by their own Indian Officers and though Clive added British Officers and men to the Native Battalions, their Indian Commandants survived for a time". It is a strange irony of fate that the very Indians, who some 150 years before commanded not only Indian Regiments or Units but also commanded British Units, including some of the British Officers as well, are now debarred from commanding their own men, leave aside the question of commanding British Officers and other ranks.

It was Clive who first started adding British Officers and men to Indian Units belonging to the Company's Army. The number so added went on increasing with the result that, gradually the number of Indian Officers of the Indian Army diminished, and since the Mutiny, the Officers of the Indian Army have come to be exclusively British. The late Honourable G. K. Gokhale said, "The compromise of 1863, decided that there should be seven British Officers to each Indian Regiment. The present organisation, however, has increased the number of Officers from seven to twelve or thirteen."

This increase in the number of British Officers in the Indian Army, led to an increase in the Military expenditure of the Government of India. Here we are only discussing the British Officers of the Indian

India Office.—Sir Malcolm Seton. pp. 180-81.

Army for there are also British Units having British Officers with King's Commission.

It is unnecessary to point out here that, a King's Commissioned Officer in the Indian Army is far more costly than the same officer in the British Units serving in India. Hence, we conclude that Indianisation includes the following three categories:—

- (1) Indianisation of the Officer Ranks of the Indian Army;
- (2) Indianisation of the Rank and File of the Indian Army;
- (3) Substitution of the British Army Units in India by Indian Units.

It has been pointed out that the so-called Indian Army is not Indian or truly National Army, but is, more or less, a mercenary force serving an alien Government. Various references to this aspect have already been given in the chapter on RECRUITING. This non-Indian element consists chiefly of the Gurkhas, the Trans-Border Pathans, etc. In all, the non-Indian element is about thirty per cent. of the total effective strength of the Indian Army. The recruitment of these non-Indian elements in the Indian Army began since the Indian Mutiny of 1857.

As to the question of the Indianisation of the Officers' Ranks of the Indian Army, it has been already seen that the Indian Units of the East India Company's Army were commanded by Indian gentlemen from noble families. At each subsequent reorganisation of the Company's Army the number of these Indian Officers came to be reduced, and simultaneously the

number of British Officers attached to the Indian Units of the Company's Army began to increase. In a short time this process resulted in the virtual elimination of the Indian Officers, and their place was naturally taken by the British Officers. Indian soldiers, however, were allowed to hold what are now known as the Viceroy's Commissions, having of course a much lower Status than the King Commissioned Officers. The introduction of these two kinds of Officers is a system peculiar to India alone. There was, however, more in this change than change in the nomenclature. The report of the Simon Commission, for instance, refers to this aspect in the following way, "What is called the Viceroy's Commission, is given to Indian soldiers, who are for the most part, promoted from the ranks of the Indian Army. But the holder of a Viceroy's Commission, whatever his experience, and length of service, is lower in rank and command than the most newly appointed and joined Subaltern of the British Army."*

It was natural, therefore, that this non-eligibility for suitable and educated Indians from high and respectable families to become King's Commissioned Officers, went a long way to change their outlook on the Army in India. With the so-called "Non-co-operation" with the Army in India, of the higher strata of society in the country, the Indian Army, in a short time, dwindled into insignificance, as a career for the youths of the higher and noble class families, so much so that, the advanced classes came to look upon the Indian Army as a vacation, where there was no position or dignity. It is queer that, this very fact of the

* *Simon Commission Report, Vol. I. p. 101.*

paucity of suitable candidates forthcoming, is trotted out as one of the pet arguments for not Indianising the Indian Army Officers' Ranks.

Sir Thomas Munroe, in a letter to Lord Hastings, in 1817, says, "No elevation of character is possible, or can be expected of any man, who, in the military line cannot attain to any rank above that of a SUBEDAR; and where the Subedar is as much behind an ENSIGN as an Ensign is below the Commander-in-Chief; and who, in the Civil line, can hope for nothing beyond judicial or revenue office, in which they may, by corrupt means, make up for their slender salary."* The same thing is observed even now. On the top of it we hear it said that the control of the Army in India could not be given to Indians, unless and until "suitable" and thoroughly efficient young men from amongst the Indians are found to fill in the vacancies that would be created by the British Officers leaving the Indian Army.

It was obvious, however, that the bar placed upon the entry of Indian Gentry to the Commissioned Ranks of the Indian Army, went a long way to precipitate a crisis. In their history of the Mutiny, Messrs. Kaye and Malletson, point out, "so it happened, in the course that the Indian Officers, who had exercised real authority in their Battalions; who had enjoyed opportunities of personal distinctions; who had felt an honourable pride in their positions, were pushed aside by the incursions of Englishmen, who took all substantive power into their hands, and left scarcely more than a shadow of rank to those whom they supplanted. An English

* *Extract from a letter, British Crown and Indian Princes. p. 128.*

Subaltern was appointed to every Company and the Indian Officer then began to collapse into something like a name. As the degradation of the Indian Officer was thus accomplished, the whole character of the Sepoy Army was changed. It ceased to be a profession in which men of high position accustomed to command, might satisfy the aspirations, and expand the energies of their lives. Thenceforth, therefore, we dug out the materials of our Army, from the lower strata of the society, and the gentry of the land, seeking Military service, carried their ambitions beyond the red-line, of the British Frontier, and offered their swords to the Princes of the Indian States.”*

Thus, by a deliberate policy, the higher classes, who till then commanded the Indian Armies of the East Indian Company, were forced to seek employment under the Indian Princes and rulers. Major Graham-Pole, remarks,† “The Pre-Mutiny Army was a unifying and consolidating Force; but after the Mutiny, came a reorganisation, inspired by a spirit of fear and distrust—a spirit which ever since, has inspired and determined our Indian Army Policy.”

So far we saw, and it has been made clear how the Government’s ever-changing policy in recruiting new men, resulted in superficially stamping certain classes as Martial and others as Non-Martial. Field-Marshal Sir Charles Brownslow says,‡ “Since 1857, we have adopted, as regards our Hindustani soldiers, a less dangerous but an equally short-sighted policy. We

* *History of the Indian Mutiny—Kaye and Melleson. Vol. I. pp. 153-54.*

† *India in Transition—Maj. Graham Pole, p. 232.*

‡ *Stray Notes—Field Marshal Sir Charles Brownslow, p. 194.*

have enlisted large numbers of men of various servile and inferior breeds, which never, since time immemorial, sent a soldier into the field, and who, though, harmless, to ourselves, are likely to be equally harmful to our enemies."

In spite of the teaching of history, the Government of India does not appear to have made any move either way. The total and complete bar against the Indians as a whole, was slightly modified about the close of the last World War, due more possibly to the exigencies of the times than to any change of outlook or even mentality. In short, till 1917, King's Commissions were a close fence to the Indians. Since then, it has, though, slightly opened. The result is that the generosity and fairmindedness of the British people made it possible for at least an intake of about 10 Indians as students at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, for ultimately being appointed as officers in the Indian Army, if successful at the final examination. This meant that though the total number of vacancies granted was ten, still, after making due allowance for wastage, etc., the number of actual appointments to the Regular Indian Units was much less. After an exhaustive inquiry by a Committee of ex-Officials and non-Officials—better known as the Sandhurst Committee or also the Skeen Committee—the number of annual vacancies was doubled, since 1929. According to the resolutions of the Defence Sub-Committee of the First Round Table Conference in 1930, an expert Committee was set up to go into the matter of finding out the ways and means of founding a Military College in India. It was hoped, particularly by the non-Official members of that Committee,

that opportunity would be granted to them to discuss and thrash out the question of the number of vacancies to be thrown open to this College. In the meanwhile, however, the Commander-in-Chief in India, foreseeing the danger, and taking a self-styled responsibility, declared on behalf of the Government, that the question of the intake of Cadets at the Indian Military College had already been fixed at a generous figure of 60; and the Committee, therefore, was precluded from discussing such an important question. He also declared the intention of the Government of India that the Cadets passing out from the Indian Military College or Academy, would be appointed to fill in vacancies so long held by the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers.

The question of Indianisation of the Officer Ranks of the Indian Army is even now vehemently denounced by certain sections of people in Great Britain, and the latest addition to these critics is, the report of the Simon Commission. In their report the Commissioners observe, "The evidence we have collected, and what we have seen in the course of our Indian tours, leave no doubts in our minds that, at least for a very long time to come, it will be impossible for the Army, entrusted with the work of defending India, to dispense with a considerable British element, including in that term British Troops of all arms,—a considerable portion of the Regimental Officers of the Indian Army and the British Personnel of the Higher Commands." In spite of these protestations, Indianisation is bound to proceed, the only difficulty being the time required for it, or what is technically called the *Pace of Indianisation*.

There are three features of the scheme of Indianisation announced by the Commander-in-Chief in India, which are very much open to criticism. As pointed out by Sir P. S. Shivaswami Aiyar, "The question regarding the pace of Indianisation and the methods to achieve it, have a most important bearing upon the capacity of the College, and also upon the speedy development of the defensive capacity of India. They are questions on which there is a fundamental difference of opinion between Military authorities and the Indian Public."*

Before going into the details, it will be better to know what our requirements and data are. It is rather peculiar that, the exact number of the King's Commissioned Officers of the Indian Army does not tally, with the figures supplied by the different authorities. The report of the Indian Military College Committee says, "The Indian Army has an Officer establishment of between 7-8 thousand, of whom two-thirds are Indians holding the Viceroy's Commissions, and the rest are King's Commissioned Officers of whom again, 105 are Indians." This means a total of about 3,000 Officers holding the King's Commissions. Dr. Munje, disagreeing with the above view observes, "The figures of the King's Commissioned Officers in the Indian Army differ widely. First, in the Defence Sub-Committee of the First Round Table Conference, the figures about Commissioned Officers are 3,141; Secondly, the Skeen Committee Report gives this number at 3,000; while the third opinion or calculation is that of the Shea Committee, whose report takes this number to

* *Report, Indian Military College Committee, 1931, p. 70.*

about 6,000. Taking for granted that the Shea Committee figures about the King's Commissioned Officers are for the total Officer establishment of the Army in India, both British and Indian, we can safely say, that the total number of King's Commissioned Officers is roughly about 4,000. The total number required for the Army has a great bearing on the pace of Indianisation. As a general rule, it takes 28 years for a Subaltern to be a Colonel, and thus be in command of a Battalion. The promotion after the rank of a Colonel is by selection, hence an officer may get a higher rank if he is qualified and provided a vacancy exists; or in the alternative he goes on a pension. If all the 4,000 officers retire after 28 years, it would mean an average of $4,000/28$ officers or a little less than 143 officers annually. Over and above this normal retirement a certain percentage leave the Army as a result of premature deaths, resignations, removals, etc. This is termed as *WASTAGE*. With Wastage as well, the figures supplied by different authorities, do not tally, though the figures supplied to the Skeen Committee appear to be more approximate. The Skeen Committee Reports says, "Colonel Brownrigg, confirmed the Sub-Committee's view that 180 was an approximately accurate estimate of the annual vacancies among officers serving with the Indian Units annually."

In order to have a constant supply of King's Commissioned Officers, and to maintain the full strength of the Officers' Cadre something like 180 new vacancies are required to be filled in for the Indian Army. There are a number of King's Commissioned Officers, whose services have been lent to non-Military departments in India,

and the same course is likely to be continued in the near future at least. Therefore, it goes without saying that, to have 180 Cadets pass out of the Indian Military Academy, every year, the intake must be something higher than the normal annual vacancies.

The figures in the Report of the Simon Commission, for 10 years, show that out of a total number of 134 Cadets admitted into the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, only 77 came out successful and eventually got Commissions. The percentage, therefore, of the annual Commissions to the total admissions for vacancies, works out to be only 60. Working on these figures, to get 180 Cadets out of the Academy per year, at least 300 boys will have to be admitted. Any other arbitrary number, must of necessity, prove any scheme of Indianisation a complete failure. Taking into consideration the arbitrary fixation of the annual intake of the Indian Military Academy at 60, and the normal wastage remaining where it was so long, go to show that in all probability only about 30 Cadets will receive Commissions. Since there are 12-14 King's Commissioned Officers in every Indian Regiment, complete Indianisation of one full Division would not take place at all with such a pace. This would be the fate of Indianisation when every Indian Unit has only 12-14 King's Commissioned Officers. According to the new scheme, the Indianised Units which will be modelled on the British pattern, would have a full complement of 28 King's Commissioned Officers. Therefore, much more time would be needed for the proposed Indianisation.

After the last World War, Indians were first admitted into the King's Commissioned Officers ranks

of the Indian Army. For sometime, they were absorbed in the general cadre of Officers, but soon afterwards, a scheme was evolved whereby these Indian Officers with King's Commissions were shelved into certain specified Indian Units where alone, future Indian King's Commissioned Officers were to be posted. This scheme is known as the *EIGHT UNITS' SCHEME*. The Simon Commission Report, referring to this Scheme, wrote, "The Eight Units already involved, form only a very small fraction of the Regular Army in India. 8 Infantry Units out of 124, 2 Cavalry Regiments out of 24, and 1 Pioneer Battalion out of 7." Thus the Eight Units' Scheme is an attempt to Indianise only about 6 per cent. of the total Indian Army Officer establishment.

The Sandhurst Committee, after throwing away the Eight Units' Scheme lock, stock, and barrel, recommended as follows:—

- (1) An immediate increase of ten vacancies at Sandhurst, making a total of 20 vacancies for Indians per year, becoming effective from 1928;
- (2) A further increase of four vacancies at Sandhurst per annum, upto 1933, making the total number of vacancies 38 in that year;
- (3) To establish, in 1933, an Indian Sandhurst, with a Capacity of 100 Cadets;
- (4) The number of boys admitted annually to the Indian Sandhurst, increases by 12 every three years, and on the assumption that all Cadets are successful, the number of Indian King's Commissioned Officers increases cor-

respondingly, until in 1938 exactly half the number of Officers recruited annually for the Indian Army would be Indians;

- (5) By 1952, half the total cadre of Officers of the Indian Army would be Indians."

The Skeen Committee based their scheme of Indianising 50 per cent. of the total Officers' Cadre of the Indian Army, on the assumption that there were 3,200 King's Commissioned Officers in the Indian Army. The period fixed for such an advance was 34 years. Thus this scheme was some advance on the previous Official Scheme popularly known as the Eight Units' Scheme. Unfortunately, however, this scheme was not approved by the Government of India after full and long consultations with the then Secretary of State for India. The Government only adopted the Skeen Committee Recommendations of doubling the annual vacancies with the result that, whereas, according to the Skeen Committee 212 Officers ought to have been holding the King's Commissions at the beginning of 1933, there were only 102 such officers, which meant that the rate of Indianisation as proposed by the Skeen Committee, though in itself meagre, was reduced by about 50 per cent.

The Skeen Committee, however, as it now appears, was kept ignorant as to the deliberations carried out by a Committee, appointed in 1922, and which has been brought to light during the proceedings of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference. This Committee, known as the Experts' Committee, had actually drawn up a scheme of Indianisation of all the King's Commissioned Officer Ranks of the

Indian Army, totalling in all about 6,854. It appears, this number also includes the King's Commissioned Officers of the British Units as well. This Scheme, in short, is as follows:—

- (1) First period of Indianisation, 14 years, 81 Cadets to be commissioned annually;
- (2) Second period of Indianisation, 9 years, 182 Cadets to be Commissioned annually;
- (3) Third period of Indianisation, 7 years, 106 Cadets to be Commissioned annually.

The circumstances under which this Committee was appointed, its terms of reference, the object behind the appointment of such a Committee, etc. and such other questions have not yet been made public upto this date. In spite of this clear-cut, clearly-worded and specific scheme, the Government of India, through their mouthpiece, the Commander-in-Chief in India, have now decided to throw open only 60 vacancies in the Indian Army every year. This roughly means that after such deliberations, and efforts, the Government have reluctantly agreed to the formula put forth by the Skeen Committee, though this in itself is not given effect to *in toto*. Whereas, the Skeen Committee held the ideal of Indianising 50 per cent. of the Officers' Ranks of the Indian Army in a definite period, the Government have now promised to Indianise one **FULL DIVISION**, that is 6 per cent. of the total Officers' strength!

The reason for this gradualness or slow and steady pace of Indianisation is not far to seek. Sir P. S. Shivaswami Aiyar, has rightly remarked in this con-

nection, "Questions regarding the pace and methods of Indianisation have a most important bearing upon the capacity of the College, and upon the speedy development of the defensive capacity of India. They are questions on which there is a fundamental difference of opinion between the Military Authorities and the Indian Public."

We have so far discussed the three main schemes of Indianising the King's Commissioned Officers' Cadre of the Indian Army. We will deal, very briefly, with the question of the Government's attitude of GRADUALNESS. Sir P. S. Shivaswami Aiyar, and General Rajwade, have clearly shown the official attitude in their Minute of Dissent, attached to the Report of the Indian Military College Committee.

With regard to the argument about the Indian's Capacity about Military Leadership, nothing can be better than to quote the Skeen Committee Report itself, "The task which the Government of India have laid upon themselves, (of Indianising the King's Commissioned Officers) is not easy. In view of the past exclusion of Indians from the higher ranks of the Army, in view of the past history, in other respects, of the India under British Rule, of her past dependence upon others, for the higher administration of the country, both civil and Military; there are difficulties which, it will require a special degree of patience and wisdom and sympathy to surmount."

The fact that Indians, not more than 100 years or so not only held higher ranks in the Company's Army, but were equals—at times to some of the well-known Military Officers and as such good *LEADERS*—is borne

out by the writings of various well-known and renowned authors of Indian History. The Mahratha Wars, the Sikh Wars,—not to mention too many others,—are an eloquent testimony of the spirit of leadership and sense of Command among the higher classes of India. Sir Francis Younghusband, like so many others, writes,* “A century ago, Ranjit Sing the great ruler of the Punjab, could hold his own against invaders from the North-West. We have done too much ourselves; and left too little to them, that is to the Indians, till now, the result is that their muscles have grown limp, and they are not strong enough to defend themselves. Bengalís have never been such good soldiers as the Sikhs and Pathans of the North, but they are far more distinguished intellectually, and for their intellect, fine field may be found in politics and diplomacy, where they would make their own special contribution towards encouraging the safety, honour, and tranquility of India.”

The Officer Class of every Army, whether national or mercenary, requires men strong enough, not in muscles only but in intellect as well. This is a truth which requires no explanation, to any one in any country of the world, *except India*, because the people who have to be convinced have a perverted mentality. In every country, *except INDIA*, efforts are being made to recruit the best brains of the country, for the Officer-Class of the National Army; and hence the question of Martial and Non-Martial classes does not exist in such countries. Only candidates who are intellectually fit, and who prove themselves as such in an open competitive exami-

* *Dawn in India—Sir Francis Younghusband p. 109*

nation, are admitted to the Commissioned ranks of the Army. Whereas, in England, it is held that *only the educated brain can rise to the occasion in case of a great strain and only the educated will take command over others** in India, special care is taken to see that differences, such as the division of the people into Martial and Non-Martial classes, etc., are kept alive, and a preponderance of the former is deliberately allowed in the Army; and simultaneously, intellect and profession is not only not given even the second place, but is unfairly kept aside, and excluded from the Army. With a view to a further strengthening of their position, the official block of the Indian Military College Committee recommended that, "In justice to the claim of this minority,—the Martial Classes—the Martial Classes should have at least 50 per cent. of the vacancies reserved for them, to be officers, in view of their backwardness as regards education, culture, and other qualities, which go to form the intellect."† The policy underlying the procedure and the various other schemes of the like nature, is an open secret. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Simon Commission should remark, "The evidence we have heard, and what we have seen in the course of our Indian Tours, leaves us no doubt in our minds, that at least for some time to come,—or a very long time—it will be impossible for the Army, entrusted with the task of defending India, to dispense with a considerable proportion of the Regimental Officers of the Indian Army and the British personnel in the higher

* *Study of War*—Sir George Ashton, p. 134.

† *Report, Simon Commission, Vol. II p. 167.*

Commands." So also General Sir George Barrow, says,* "Not only must the higher Command and the Staff, to a very large proportion, of the Regimental Units and the formation of the Indian Army, remain British, but that, irrespective of the rate at which Indianisation proceeds, a considerable, and we might add, a preponderating number of the Indian Army must also be British for a very long and indeterminable period."

It would be sufficient to prove that it is not the defect amongst the Indians, but certain other things, such as the racial complex, etc., which is at the root of the Governmental attitude. Sir Valentine Chirol, for instance, observes,† "Though, the Army Department may now wish to approach the subject of Indianisation, chiefly from the point of view of Military Efficiency, it has to reckon with strong racial objections of British Officers, to be placed with the position of taking orders from Indian Officers." The Skeen Committee, after dealing with all such arguments finally stated, "We are aware that the official view hitherto expressed has been that, the basis of any scheme of Indianisation cannot be broadened unless and until a larger number of fit candidates come forward to compete for the vacancies at present available. But we, regarding the matter from the human and practical standpoint, and looking to what we believe, must be the psychology of potential candidates, are convinced, that there can be no hope of real progress so long as the present official view which we have mentioned, is maintained." Sir Charles

* *Journal, East India Association.* January 1931.

† *India—Sir Valentine Chirol,*

depicts the true official view when he says,* "The best educated are not the best valiant of our Indian soldiers, and if competitive examinations were eventually to decide the claims of candidates for the higher command the *SIKHS*, the *GURKHAS*, and the *AFRIDIS*, would have little chance against the *BENGALI* and the *ANGLICISED INDIAN*, whose brain might weigh more than his heart."

In spite of the above pronouncements, the Government not only maintains its former attitude, but has now begun setting about barriers in Indianising the Officer Ranks of the Indian Army. The Indian Military College Committee, consisting both of Officials and Non-Officials, decided by a majority, mostly of Officials, that, "Most of us consider it essential to reserve a large number of vacancies for the classes that furnish recruits to the Army, in order to encourage these Classes generally, to ensure them their representation in the King's Commissioned Ranks of the Indian Army, and to offer adequate prospects of promotion to the rank and file." This theory of reserving the higher Officer Ranks of the Army of a country to those people who furnish the greatest number of recruits is, we dare say, quite unparalleled. In almost all other countries, in the world, recruits are selected from among the general masses, on their fulfilling certain tests; whereas, the Officers are recruited by means of an open competitive examination, where the standard is naturally very high, so that an average layman, who passes the physical fitness test to enter the Army as a recruit, would find it very difficult to pass the competitive examination and

* *Stray Notes*—Field Marshal Sir Charles Brownlow, pp. 102-03.

become an officer. No doubt, there are people who have risen to be Field-M Marshals, from ordinary privates, but such cases are rare. It would not be inappropriate to give some more details. The officering of the British Army is made as follows:—*

Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers:—**By open Competition.** Through Royal Military Academy; Woolwich;

Infantry and Cavalry:—**By open competition,** through the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. (50 per cent. of the vacancies;)

By qualification from the Colonial subjects and also through the ranks. (25 per cent. of the vacancies.) This also includes the Queen's Cadets, University Candidates at Home, University Cadets from the Colonies or the Colonial Military Forces.

The Non-Commissioned Officers promoted from the ranks.

From the above it would appear that the "RANKER" element in the Army is hardly more than 10 per cent. In the Indian Military College Committee's Report, Sir P. S. Shivaswami Aiyar, in his Minute of Dissent, observes, "According to the existing practice (since the Skeen Committee recommendations came into effect) 16 out of the 25 vacancies for Commissions are filled up by competition, or roughly about 65 per cent. of the total number of candidates are selected by open competition. Of the remaining

* *Army Book of the British Empire* Lt- Gen. Goodcough, p. 416.

9, 5 vacancies are given to the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and 4 are filled in by the Commander-in-Chief out of those who have obtained qualifying marks in the entrance examination." This means that the reservation of the Commissioned Officers' ranks in the Indian Army, for the ordinary recruits was formerly 5 out of 20, or roughly about 25 per cent. per year. In Canada, France, Italy, Japan, The United States of America, etc. higher grade ranks in the National Army are not reserved for any class or community but are generally given to those who prove themselves fit in the qualifying test.

In India, the Government exactly does the opposite of what is in vogue in other countries, under the pretext that after all, circumstances and conditions differ. But the moment the question arises of keeping the old Indian Army system or organisation in its traditional form, the Government changes its front and begins by arguing that the Indian Army Organisation of the old fashion must be changed according to the British pattern. This proves that the Government is not serious about Indianisation, and even at times, contradicts itself to stave off the *Evil Day*!

As for the paucity of Indian Candidates coming to the Indian Military Academy, it would be enough to quote the Skeen Committee Report, "The most substantial reason for the dearth of candidates, and one which we believe, after careful consideration, to be the governing factor in regard to future policy, is the narrow scope of Scheme of Indianisation of the higher ranks of the Army in India which has so far been sanctioned."

The Skeen Committee also pointed out that, "In saying that the basis for selection should be wide, we mean, '*inter alia*,' that the preference of soldiers' sons as a class, which is a feature of the present system of selection, should in future become the exception, rather than the rule." As if not content with this, Sir Malcom Hailey says, "It may be asked whether it is advisable to continue to show any such preference to the Military and the Land-owning Classes, as would seem to imply a desire to exclude men, whose families are mainly engaged in commerce and industry, or literary pursuits; I would myself answer this question in the *NEGATIVE*."

Finally we come to the question of the probability or otherwise of the New King's Commissioned Officers, commanding the confidence of the so-called Martial Classes, that is, the ordinary Sepoys, of the Indian Army. It sounds rather strange that the very Government who have so long maintained the highest reputation of implicit obedience to the orders of the superiors, both in civil as well as Military matters or vocations, should say that superior officers must prove that their subordinates would, as heretofore, obey their orders, irrespective of the fact that they (the superior officers) belonged to the Martial classes or to the Non-Martial classes. Sir Malcom Hailey, fortunately holds contrary views on this subject, when he says, "I have seen very many men among the professional classes, who would, in my opinion, make good officers, and I do not doubt that after a time, the private soldier will, himself, prefer to be led by a good man, in whose guidance he can trust, whatever may have been his family origin. I think, in short,

that the process of education among the men who join the subordinate ranks, will have its inevitable result in reducing the preference they may now feel for men of the particular classes."

As a result of Government policy, class, race, and religious differences among the rank and file of the Indian Army have already reached a very high pitch. The Government now brings about a cleavage between the superior officers of the Indian Army and their subordinates by unnecessarily trumpeting their agelong dislike for the so-called BABU class. No where has there been any instance of insubordination to the superior officers by their subordinates and this is especially so as far as the Army vocation is concerned. It can be confidently said, that in India too, nobody should have such unnecessary fear about the future relations between the officers and the men of the Indian Army.

The question of the abolition of the Viceroy's Commissions will have very important bearings on the future of the Indian Army. The two joint authors of the Minute of Dissent to the Indian Military College Committee, observe, "The organisation of the Army in every country is adopted to its own circumstances, and requirements, and there is no rule of abstract science or logic, compelling any country to accept or adopt any pattern of the Army of the one to the other, without regard to its own administrative necessities, and other considerations."

It appears, however, from the decision of the Government, that in spite of the many changes in the points of view of officials, and even after the acceptance

of the principle of self-determination in civil matters, the same is denied to the Army in India. It is curious to note that the high Military Officers, who were members of the Indian Military College Committee should find the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers dispensable only in the case of the Indianised Units. The logical explanation is that the Viceroy's Commissioned Officer as an intermediary, is a necessity to a Non-Indian Officer, due to his young age, inexperience, and a lack of knowledge about the sepoys in the Non-Indianised Units. But then the question arises as to the propriety of having such foreign officers at all!

Out of a total officer strength of about 4,700, the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers number about 2,800, while the King's Commissioned Officers number only 1,800. The rough percentages of the two types of officers, Indian and British, comes to about 61 and 39 respectively. Taking the King's Commissioned Officer as an equivalent to about six Viceroy's Commissioned Officers, with regard to the pay, allowances, etc., the elimination of the present Viceroy's Commissions would mean an extra expenditure on Indian Units, according to the present standard of pay, etc. of about 300 per cent. In these days of financial stringency, is such an increased expenditure advisable, merely because the Indian Army is going to be on the British Pattern? The answer is superfluous.!

The Indian Military College Committee Minority Report, lays the following as one of the new arguments of the official side against the popular demand, "As Commissioned Officers must take part in the training and leading of platoons and troops, and if the Indian

King's Commissioned Officers are unwilling to dispense with the intermediary,—the Viceroy's Commissioned Officer,—they are deemed to shirk their responsibility." It was expected that the higher authorities would try their best not to give currency to those facts that are not proved. No Indian King's Commissioned Officer has as yet shirked his responsibility. It is a very harmful precedent to distinguish between an Indian King's Commissioned Officer and a British King's Commissioned Officer. Such a differentiation may ultimately give rise to racial feelings, and as such, it is better to take a broader view of the case. "As both the King's Commissioned Officers and the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers are of the same class the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers would not obey the orders of the King's Commissioned Officers, and friction thus may arise, making the position of the Indian King's Commissioned Officer intolerable." It would have been much better had the Government given some concrete proposals or examples, and facts about insubordination on the part of the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers in their relations with their superiors. The general experience in civil matters is that there is hardly any difference made by the subordinates, as regards their obeying of orders of their superiors, be they British or Indian. However, in case of any such solitary instance, the rules and regulations as regards discipline, etc. in all the departments, and especially the Military Department of the Government of India, are quite sufficient to deal with any such hypothetical case of breach of discipline. If only an exemplary and deterrent punishment is awarded to a culprit in the first flush of Indianisation, such things would very

easily cease in due course. It is however, interesting to see how the official mind works and how arguments are trotted out, based mostly on hypothetical cases.

We have already discussed the principles of reserving such a large number as fifty per cent. of the total annual intake at the Dehra Dun Military Academy, for the so-called Martial Classes. It is a principle which deserves nothing but wholesale condemnation. Whereas in all advanced countries, efforts are being made to nationalise the Army without any reservation of Officer's ranks, at least to any particular class, sect or community, so that each and every individual may get a chance to serve in the Army, and thus ultimately be of use to the Motherland. The Government of India, like a Medieval ruler, is still trying to prove that the Army in India is after all, a vocation meant only for the privileged few. We cannot but quote here, what the Minority Committee of the Indian Military College Committee, said in their Dissenting Minute. "*We believe that if the policy of Indianisation were started in right earnest and carried out on sound national lines, it should be possible for us to train ourselves and to undertake the responsibility for defence within a period of something like thirty years.*"

CHAPTER VIII

THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE INDIAN STATES' FORCES.

The Indian States' Forces form a part of the Indian Army. The Subsidiary Alliances of Lord Wellesly, was the first step taken by the East India Company to check the growing strength of the various Indian Principalities. This was indirectly a "Peaceful Penetration." These alliances were designed to prevent Napoleon, the French Emperor, from getting help from any of the Indian Principalities. Under these Subsidiary Alliances, the Company was to maintain a Force for the protection of the Native Rulers, at their own expense. Due to the uncertainty of some of the Indian Principalities, coupled with the inability of the East India Company to control the finances of these Rulers or Princes, the Company acquired large and fertile tracts from the contracting parties for the maintenance of the Subsidiary Force. As to the stationing of this Force, it was decided that such a Contingent should remain at the capital of the reigning Prince concerned. This stationing of the Subsidiary Force usually accompanied the exchange of Ministers. Thus in a short time, every State had a Resident stationed at its Court. Subsequently, however, the foreign relations of these contracting parties or States, were also taken over by the Residents directly and the Governor-General of India indirectly.

With the gradual penetration of the Company's Forces and the Company's Officers into the territories

of the Indian Princes, it was natural, that the Princes should begin to feel the necessity of reducing their own Forces. The Company also, through the agency of the respective Residents, encouraged these Princes to bring about a reduction in the total strength of their State Forces, from time to time. Gradually, the States came to have two different types of Troops; the Subsidiary Force, for which they paid but over which they had no control, and their own Troops.

The Eden Committee, appointed to report on the Reorganisation of the Indian Army after the events of 1858, considered the precautions to be taken for the future safety of India. With this aim in view, they made certain recommendations. It was inevitable, however, that this Committee should not refer to the future of the States' Forces. The Committee took a particular interest not because such Contingents were of benefit to the Government, but the Committee believed these were likely to be very dangerous to the Company's authority in India. The Committee, for instance, says,* "It cannot be overlooked that the Armies of the Native States are, or may become, elements of danger to the British power." The same Committee, thereafter, specifically pointed out,† "The only Native Armies which, from their numbers, discipline, and organisation, require watching at the hands of the British Government are the Armies of the Maharaja Shinde, the Gwalior Chief, and the Nizam of Hyderabad."

Describing the real condition of some of the Forces of these Indian States, especially those which were

* *Eden Committee Report*, paras 35-36.

† *Ibid* 187/9.

termed *DANGEROUS* by the Eden Committee, the report states,* "In regard to the Troops of the Native States, generally, we may add that, the absence of any cohesion or common feeling between these Armies, of which the total strength is twice as large as the whole of the British Native Imperial Forces; and the fact that they possess little organised Artillery or Rifled Ordnance, and no Breech-Loading Guns; are the chief reasons why these Troops do not form potential elements of danger, or cause any anxiety to the British Government."

Thus, though the Committee knew full well that, for all practical purposes the State Forces, would not be dangerous to the British Government in the least, they were unwilling to allow even these unorganised and ill-equipped Forces to remain in sufficient numbers. They, therefore, suggested that the Government of India should, somehow, prevail upon these Princes to reduce their respective Forces to a *nonentity*. They actually said in their report, "In justice to everything, we recommend the British Government that they should take measures to reduce the Nizam's Government to curtail the Irregular Levies maintained under various names all over the Hyderabad territory, and to restrict the reformed Troops to such moderate numbers as may be required to support the dignity of the Nizam, and to keep order among the population of the city of Hyderabad."

As long as 1817, that is, hardly within twenty years of the innovation of the Wellesleyan policy, Sir Thomas Munroe, in a letter to Lord Hastings, the then

* *Eden Committee Report, para 38.*

Governor-General, said, "There are many weighty objections to the employment of a Subsidiary Force. It has the natural tendency to render the Government of the country, in which it exists, weak and oppressive; and to extinguish all honourable spirit among the high classes of the society; and to degrade and to impoverish the whole people." Sir Alfred Lyall, in one of his books,* remarks "Insecurity from internal revolt and foreign attack bred indolence and irresponsibility, and mismanagement of the revenues increased the burden of the subsidy, and thus indirectly increased maladministration. It was partly the consequence of the Subsidiary System, which then became a reason for continuing it."

The dawn of the twentieth century shows that the wheel has taken a complete turn. Instead of the past policy of mistrust as regards the more important and influential States in India, as well as their Military power, a new policy was evolved known as the "Imperial Service Troops." These are now known as Indian States' Forces. This change of front was beneficial to the Government of India in numerous ways. The first and the foremost of these was the addition to the Effective Strength of the Indian Army of a large number of trained soldiers without any addition of extra expenditure for the Government of India. To ensure co-operation and co-ordination in the maintenance and organisation of these various Forces, the Indian Princes, on their own initiative, accepted the principle of general supervision and control over their Forces, by the Commander-in-Chief in India, who delegates this authority to special officers

* *British Dominion in India*—Sir Alfred Lyall, p. 289.

appointed for the purpose, and who are styled as Military Advisors of Indian States' Forces. At present, therefore, these Forces are included in the Effective Military Strength of India.

A question naturally arises at this juncture as to the fate of these various State Contingents maintained by the various States, according to Treaty obligations. It has been shown that, very large and fertile tracts, yielding crores of rupees as revenue every year, were handed over by these Indian Princes to the British Government, to meet the expenses of the Subsidiary Contingents. It has been computed by the Directorate of the Chamber of Princes that "In total, in return for the cessations of territory, the subsidies maintained are 46,623 men of the Infantry, 19,148 men of the Cavalry, and a certain number of Batteries of Artillery." This means that the Indian Princes to-day, indirectly maintain nearly a third of the total Indian Army.

A few words, it is hoped, with regard to the methods of computing subsidies, would not be out of place here. As Lord Wellesley wrote,* "The principle on which the Subsidy was computed, was on the basis of the Hyderabad precedent. In commutation of Rs. 40 lakhs, a territory rated—at that time—at the annual value of Rs. 62 lakhs was taken in full sovereignty." The Directorate of the Chamber of Princes, likewise, refer in their report, "In 1902, Berar, which was assigned to the Government since 1853, in order to discharge Rs. 32 lakhs, yielded a revenue of Rs. 119 lakhs—an increase of 270 per cent; while the

* *Wellesley's Despatches*, p. 205.

total cost of the Army in India has increased only by about 140 per cent, during this period.”*

It is no wonder, therefore, that the Indian States should now clamour for a thorough revision of these Subsidies' question, at a critical time such as this. There is another significance to this demand of the Indian States' representatives, namely, the inability of the Government of India to fulfil their own Treaty obligations. As has been seen, the Government of India bound themselves by various Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads, to maintain a particular number of men or Armed Forces as a Contingent, for the protection of the Indian Princes. As a result, however, of peace and tranquillity maintained by the British Government, since the year 1857, the Government of India found it possible to reduce these Contingents from the various States. The Government, at the same time, continued to enjoy the ever increasing revenues from the territories ceded by the Indian States' Rulers. The Directorate of the Chamber of Princes', special organisation, tried to evolve a scheme whereby they declared themselves willing to share the defence expenditure of the Government of India, proportionately or rateably, provided they were allowed the possession and use of the ceded territories. In their report they say, "The total cost of the Army in India is Rs. 56 crores. The cost of the Troops providing the defences of the Indian States, and in which the States are interested is only Rs. 42 crores. The population of the Indian States is only 72 millions, out of a total of 319 millions for the whole of India.

* *British Crown and Indian States*, p. 63.

Therefore, the States should be held responsible only for Rs. 9 crores."

It would be interesting to see the history of these States' Contingents. It is common knowledge that many foreigners who sought service under some of the Indian Princes during the eighteenth century and also a part of the nineteenth century, used to receive emoluments quite out of proportion to those of others. These emoluments do not stand any comparison, whatsoever, to the present standards. An ordinary third class officer, for instance, provided he was of European parentage, used to receive, as pay and allowances, far more than the highest Military Officials of the Indian Army to-day. The pay and allowances of British Officers of these Contingents, maintained at the expense of the Indian Princes were many times more than those prevailing in the Company's Forces in those days. The Commandant of the Nizam's Forces, for instance, was paid £5,000 sterling per year, a salary larger than what the Commander-in-Chief in India received in those days. Other Officers of the Contingents were paid in like proportion.*

At the present time, therefore, there is hardly any justification for the events of the past to be continued indefinitely. These Contingents were forced upon the Indian States and territories exacted from them in the form of a perpetual lease, the revenues of which were more than sufficient to meet the expenses of the Contingents stationed in the respective States. These expenses were, as has been already observed, very high.

* *Life of Lord Metcalfe—Kaye's. Vol. II, p. 15.*

INDIAN ARMY & INDIAN STATES' FORCES 127

Then again, the revenues of the territories so ceded have now increased three-fold or even more. Leaving aside the question whether or not the Government wants the Indian States to maintain additional Forces for the use of the Imperial Government, it cannot be overlooked that some at least of the more important States have maintained these Forces over and above their own Local Forces.

To sum up, the Company took territories for maintaining the subsidiary Contingents, and to protect the Indian Princes. The Government of India still receives the revenues from such territories ceded, but have not stationed adequate Troops for the protection of the Indian Princes, according to the letter and the spirit of the Subsidiary Treaties. With their latest policy, they have encouraged the Indian States to maintain Imperial Service Troops under Government supervision and for the use of the Government of India, almost entirely, thus indirectly making them spend more. Finally, the Government protection being only in name, the States have to keep Irregular Troops for internal security.

Turning to the expenditure side of this question, it would be obvious that a very large percentage of the total revenues of some of these States is taken up by the so-called ARMIES of the Indian States. This expenditure varies from about 10-25 per cent. of the total revenues of the States. There would hardly be any exaggeration if we say, that such an expenditure is quite unnecessary. There is an exhaustive list of items on which money could be spent more wisely, judiciously and in the best interests of

the States' subjects concerned. It appears however, that the time for such a realisation is far distant yet.

There is another point in suggesting such a wholesale elimination of the States' Armies. The events since the last World War are moving very fast, more so, since the last decade. The Round Table Conference in London, in which the tri-partite representatives, that is the representatives of the British Government, those of British India and those again of the Indian States, participated and have unanimously resolved that the future constitution of India as a whole, should be of a Federal character. A Federation, as the word is defined in any standard book on Political Science, means a union of a number of Independent Units, who are themselves ready to surrender, if necessity arises some or any of their privileges and sovereign rights for the good of all. Without entering into any further discussion as to what particular rights and privileges the Indian States should surrender to the future Federal Authority we may at once say quite safely, that amongst all these sovereign rights and privileges, the most important one worth surrendering is the Army or Defence. Not only will this solve many other intricate problems peculiar to India, but it will go a long way to give some relief to the helpless tax-payers of some of the Indian States. An annual saving of about *FOUR CRORES OF RUPEES*, or even more, is not a trifling sum indeed. But what is needed, above all, is statesmanship, coupled with a broad outlook.

CHAPTER IX

ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

The present organisation of the Indian Army is the outcome of the report of the Easher Committee of 1919.

The Governor-General-in-Council is the supreme Head of the Army in India, both British and Indian. The administrative control of the Army, however, is exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, who is an extra-ordinary Member of the Governor-General's Council, and is in charge of the Army or the Defence Department.

The Army Department of the Government of India consists of four branches, each under a Principal Staff-Officer as follows:—

- (1) The Chief of the General Staff: This branch deals with Military policy, with plans of operations for the Defence of India, with the organisation and distribution of the Army for internal security and external use, in accordance with the policy of the Government, with the collection and distribution of intelligence, with the supervision and the training of the Army, with the use of the Military Force in War, with War Regulations, with the education of Officers and other Ranks, and with the inter-communication services.

- (2) The Adjutant-General: This branch deals with all matters pertaining organisations, and the maintenance of the Military Forces the peace distribution of the Army, Discipline, Martial, Military and International Law, Medical and Sanitary measures, relating to the Troops, personal and ceremonial matters, prisoners of war, pay and pensions, questions, recruiting, mobilization, and demobilization.
- (3) The Quarter-Master General's Branch: This branch is concerned with the maintenance and issue of supplies, etc., that is, food stuffs, forage, fuel, Mechanical Transport, Vehicles, and connected stores, animals, and reserves of these articles, with services responsible for the transportation, movement and quartering of Troops with the supply and transport services, Military Works, with the Remount and Veterinary Services, the Farms Department, and with the Garrison and Regimental Institutes. Since the Great War, the responsibilities of the Quarter-Master General's Branch have increased to a very great extent. This is attributable specifically to the creation of new services, such as Mechanical Transport, and to the Fundamental Change of policy by which, since the war, Indian Troops are fed and mounted entirely by Government, instead of under Regimental arrangements.
- (4) The Master-General of Ordnance: This Branch comprises of five different but subsidiary

Directorates with duties that are independent. These Directorates are as follows:—

- (i) Ordnance Factories and Manufacture: This Directorate administers the Army Factories in India, and assists in the development of manufacture in India of munition by private manufacture;
- (ii) Artillery; This Directorate deals with Design, Research, experiments, Patterns, Scales of all Equipments, of the Army (except the Mechanical Transport), with Patterns, Scales of Specifications of Clothing and Necessaries, also with Inspection, and Maintenance of such Stores;
- (iii) Ordnance Services; This Directorate controls the Arsenal and Depots, and the Indian Army Ordnance Corps, and is responsible for the provision of all equipment (except Mechanical Transport), and Clothing for the Army;
- (iv) Technical Organisation; This Directorate is responsible for co-ordination of Resources, war maintenance, Mobilization and Special Reserves, also for Mobilization Policy;
- (v) Contracts; This Directorate deals with the purchase of Food-Stuffs, Coal, Oil-petrol, Paints-Varnishes, etc., Hardware, Machinery, Engineering Stores, etc., also the disposal of Surplus, and Obsolete Stores, Machinery, etc. In matters relating to the purchase of Food-Stuffs, this Directorate

is not responsible to the Quarter-Master General in India.

The Officers appointed to the Staff are specially selected Officers, taken normally from among those who have graduated at the Staff College at Camberlay, or Quetta. The Staff Colleges are institutions where Officers, after passing a competitive entrance examination, undergo a course of Instruction in Advanced Military Science, and where they study the work of each Fighting Arm, and of each Administrative Service and Department of the Army. No Officer is posted permanently to the Staff. After a period of Staff appointment, limited as a general rule to four years, an officer returns to his Unit for a Tour of Regimental Duty, in order that he may keep in touch with Regimental work, which is essential that he should do. Moreover, no Staff Officer is trained solely with duties with one of the Branches of the Staff; it is important that Officers of each Branch should acquaint themselves with the working of other Branches, in order that they may know what assistance they can give and receive, and in order also to ensure the proper allocation of responsibility and to avoid overlapping of work. To obtain this result, arrangements are made for the periodical exchange of Officers (Staff Officers) between the different Branches of the Staff.

There is also a fifth Branch at the Army Head Quarters, with an Officer of the Finance Department of the Government of India attached to it. He is of a status of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India, and is styled as Financial Advisor, Military Finance to the Commander-in-Chief.

For purposes of Decentralisation, the Army in India is divided into Four Commands, Thirteen Districts, which are further classified as First Class or Second Class, according to the importance of each; and Thirty-six Brigades. These Commands, Districts, and Brigades, as the case may be, have practically the same Organisation as the Army Head-Quarters, and the allocation of duties is in exact correspondence. There are, of course, certain differences, one being that the lower the formation, the fewer in number are the appointments and the lower is their grading; further, the work of the Adjutant-General's and Quarter-Master General's Branches is usually combined in one Administrative Staff Officer. The composition of the Staff of Commands and Districts varies with the special requirements of each.

In the chapter on the History of the Indian Army, we saw how the function of the general superintendence, control and administration of the Company's possessions and Territories in India began to devolve more and more upon the Governor-General, who, since the passing of the Pitt's India Bill, was looked upon as the nominee of the Parliament, being appointed by the King, on the advice of the then Prime Minister of Great Britain. This necessarily meant that there were always to be seen differences of opinion between the Directors of the East India Company and their Governor-General in India. The proceedings of the various Select Committees, appointed by Parliament, to consider the position of the East India Company and its possessions, trade, etc., at the time of the renewal of each Charter to the said Company, shows the existence of a clearly laid-out plan by Parliament

to control the activities of the East India Company so as to reduce and concentrate into the hands of its chosen representative, the Governor-General, these two activities. The various Secret Committees and their conflicts with the Board of Control, the direct access of the Governor-General, both with the Prime Minister of England, as well as to the Secret Committee, is sufficient proof of the nature and intentions, and policy of Parliament. Again, the unanimity, and later on, the dependence of India's Affairs upon those of Great Britain, further show the helplessness of the Company's Directors in carrying on the control and Government according to their plans. The Nepal Wars, the Gurkha Wars, the Afghan Wars, the Burmese Wars, to name but a few of such incidents, are a clear indication of the happenings in those days. Thus, till 1857, the nominal control over the Government of India lay with the Directors of the East India Company, while the real control was exercised by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, through the Governor-General in India, with a view to the interests of the people of Great Britain. Without entering into a discussion as to the importance of Military Policy and the Administration of the Army in India, we may say that, the very fact that this question has been excluded from popular control, even in recent discussions on India's future Constitution, in itself shows the importance and the gravity of the problem.

We alluded to the dual control of the Company's affairs in India before 1857. Strange, though it may appear, a like situation was being practised as regards the Military Department of the Government of India, even after that year. This dual authority was the

Commander-in-Chief on the one hand, and the Military Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, on the other. Both these Officers were members of the Governor-General's Executive Council, and as such harmony in the Departmental working was more an exception than the rule. Matters soon came to a head, when Lord Kitchner was sent from England to command the Indian Army, and also to reorganise the administration and control of the Army Department of the Government of India. It was in this connection that the famous Kitchner-Curzon controversy arose, which resulted in the resignation of Lord Curzon of the Governor-Generalship of India. Lord Ronaldshay, in his life of Lord Curzon, has summarised these events, and the discussion thereon, as follows,* "Lord Kitchner started his Indian career with a violent bias against the system under which the Executive Control of the Army in India was vested in one authority, the Commander-in-Chief; and the Administrative Control in another namely, the Government of India itself, exercised through the Military Member. The Government of India ordinarily, delegated the authority on military matters to the Military Member. The system, in fact, was modelled on that of the British Cabinet responsibility, the Military Member and the Commander-in-Chief corresponding to the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief of England." The same authority, sums up the results of the Kitchner Reforms by saying, "In face of Lord Kitchner's assertion, it was indeed a jest on the part of FATE, the humour of which must have been apparent to Lord Curzon, that Sir Beauchamp-Duff, who had

* *Life of Lord Curzon—Lord Ronaldshay. Vol. II, p. 393.*

been Lord Kitchner's right-hand man in the 1905 controversy, should not only have found himself in Lord Kitchner's shoes in 1915, administering the system which Lord Kitchner had introduced, and should have been compelled to admit in his evidence, before the Mesopotamian Commission that, while in times of peace, any man could discharge the dual function imposed upon him, it was more than he could do or manage in times of War."!

It would be interesting here to give a short account of the Army Administration in Great Britain. Lieutenant Lindsell observes,* "The policy governing the organisation of the British Army is determined by the British Cabinet. In forming this policy, the Cabinet is assisted by the recommendations and proceedings of the Committee of Imperial Defence." In short, the organisation, etc., of the British Army is carried on by the British Cabinet acting on the advice of the Secretary of State for War in the British Cabinet. It is a general rule, that the Secretary of State for War should be a civilian, and not an Army Officer of any rank. The work of the War Office is carried on by an Army Council, presided over by the Secretary of State for War. This Council is composed of about eight members, of whom three are Parliamentary representatives, four Military representatives, and one Civilian member. The Army Council is as follows:—

- (1) President:—The Secretary of State for War;
- (2) Vice-President:—The Under Secretary of State for War;

* *Military Organisation & Administration. Lindsell, p. 10.*

- (3) First Military Member:—Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
- (4) Second Military Member:—The Adjutant General;
- (5) Third Military Member:—Quarter-Master General;
- (6) Fourth Military Member:—Master-General of Ordnance;
- (7) Finance Member:—Parliamentary and Financial Secretary;
- (8) Secretary, Army Council:—Permanent Under Secretary to the Secretary of State for War;

In the War Council Organisation, it appears there is a very smooth and healthy mixture of both civil and military elements. In India on the otherhand, there is not even a semblance of any civil element in the Military Administration and Organisation. Again, the Commander-in-Chief, being an extra-ordinary Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, is not responsible to the elected Legislative Assembly in India. According to the recommendations of the Easher Committee, the Commander-in-Chief is given the freedom to correspond directly with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in England. Instead of the Army Council, the various Departments in India are directly under the Commander-in-Chief.

The Kitchner-Curzon controversy, to which a reference was made a while ago, could have been avoided altogether, it may be thought, had the then

Viceroy suggested the appointment of a civilian to be the Military Member of the Government of India. It was but natural, for the then Commander-in-Chief to oppose any proposal, whereby power to assent or to dissent was vested in the hands of an official, who was lower in rank than the Commander-in-Chief, himself. Hence, the appointment of a civilian, in charge of the Army Department of the Government of India, would have certainly gone a long way, to introduce the healthy co-operation between the civil and the Military Departments, which is quite a common feature in all modern countries.

In 1919, the Easher Committee recommended certain changes in the Organisation and the administration of the Indian Army. One of their recommendations was to introduce the principle of Decentralisation. Accordingly, the whole of the Indian Army is now divided into various Commands, Districts and Brigades to which a reference has been made recently. This appears to be a system which is copied from the one in vogue in England. Each of these smaller Units is further sub-divided, so that the Commander-in-Chief should not be required to bother himself directly, for the training, equipment, etc., of the Army in any particular area or Command, as that function is now entrusted to the respective District or Command or Brigade Commander concerned.

The Army in India is divided into different categories, such as Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, etc. The largest Infantry Unit is the Division, consisting of three Brigades, and Divisional Troops, each Brigade being further sub-divided into *FOUR* Battalions. Each

Battalion consists of Four Companies, and one Head Quarter's Company. Each of these Companies are further divided into Four Platoons, consisting of Four Sections each, each Section constituting *EIGHT* men. As regards the Cavalry, there is no Cavalry formation larger than a Brigade. The Indian Cavalry is organised into Seven Groups each Group consisting of Three Regiments, making a total of *TWENTY-ONE* Regiments of Indian Cavalry. A Cavalry Regiment is further sub-divided into Four Squadrons, and one Head Quarter's Squadron. Each one of these Squadrons is further sub-divided into Four Troops, roughly on the same lines as the Platoon of the Infantry. There is, however, this difference that, whereas, Indian Cavalry Regiments are based on a Class-Squadron basis, the Indian Infantry Regiments are based on a class-Company basis.

Every Regiment of Indian Cavalry, has a Head Quarter's Company besides its Regular Four Companies. This Head Quarter's Company or Squadron, as the case may be, is divided into different Groups.

Every Brigade of Artillery is sub-divided into three or four Batteries, according to convenience; each of the Batteries being further sub-divided into two sections, each one of such sections consisting of two guns.

We have so far seen the organisation of the three main Arms or Branches of the Indian Army. There are various other Branches such as the Indian Army Service Corps, the Indian Army Veterinary Service Corps, the Indian Army Medical Corps, the Indian Army Signal Corps, etc. All these Services, though

important for carrying out operations, do not belong to the Fighting Forces proper. Hence these Services are called Ancillary Services. It is very difficult, however, to give any exact strength of the various elements belonging to these Ancillary Services, because the strength and the normal personnel of these Services depends very largely upon the kind of warfare, and like different factors. We have already seen that Lord Kitchner, when Commander-in-Chief in India, organised the whole of the Indian Army into six Divisions, each one of these Six Divisions, being organised on a war footing, so that in the event of war, each one of these six Divisions would be complete in all its component Arms of Defence, together with a proportionate element of the Ancillary Services.

The average total cost of some typical Units, as is given in the Defence Estimates of the Government of India for the year 1933-34 are as follows:— (the figures are in lakhs of rupees).

British Cavalry	17.06	British Infantry	18.47
Indian Cavalry	2.27	Indian Infantry	5.20
Light Battery	3.84	Medium Battery	4.51
Heavy Battery	2.36		

ORGANISATION OF INDIAN ARMY 141

On the 1st. April 1933, the Fighting Services in India consisted of the following Categories, with the various particulars:—

Category.	British King's Commissioned Officers	Indian King's Commissioned Officers.	British Other Ranks.	Indian Vice- roy's Com- missioned Officers.	Indian Other Ranks.	Followers.
A. Fighting Forces						
India Burma.						
(a) Cavalry,						
(i) British ...	135	...	2,835	...	65	1,190
(ii) Indian ...	259	25	...	399	10,360	4,032
Total Cavalry ...	394	25	2,835	399	10,425	5,222
(b) Artillery,						
(i) Royal Horse Artillery ...	28	...	772	4	230	456
(ii) Royal Field Artillery ...	292	...	6,469	41	1,799	2,545
(iii) Mountain Artillery ...	140	...	572	122	6,679	763
(iv) Medium Artillery ...	46	...	1,014	8	398	114
(v) Heavy Arti- llery ...	28	...	399	4	194	32
Training Centres Depots, etc.
Total Artillery ...	552	...	9,384	201	10,765	4,111
(c) Engineers ...	153	...	180	208	9,533	728
(d) Pioneers	2	102	...
(e) Infantry—						
(i) British ...	1,260	...	33,935	45	1,935	2,520
(ii) Tr. Com- panies ...	1	4	345	12
(f) Indian Infan- try—						
(i) Active Bns..	852	84	...	1,561	54,833	3,746
(ii) Gurkhas ...	260	441	18,159	1,180
(iii) Indian Tr. Coys. ...	89	89	812	54
(iv) Companies.	78	156	11,465	702
Total ...	2,540	84	38,935	2,296	87,451	8,214

Category.	British King's Commissioned Officers.	Indian King's Commissioned Officers.	British Other Ranks.	Indian Vice- roy's Com- missioned Officers.	Indian Other Ranks.	Followers.
(h) Signal Corps--	153	...	3,200	63	3,432	746
(i) Reservists—						
(1) Cavalry	2,943	...
(2) Artillery	2,329	...
(3) Engineers...	1,675	...
(4) Pioneers
(5) Infantry	24,120	...
(6) Signals	994	...
(7) Royal Nuc- leus	654	3
(8) Supplemen- tary Regi- ment	247	...
Total ...	1	32,966	3
B. Miscellaneous,						
(1) Governor General's Band ...	2	5	110	60
(2) Officers with King's unem- ployed or on the unattach- ed list ...	91	24
Total (Misc) ...	93	24	...	5	110	60
C. Indian Infan- try—						
Serving at Hong- kong ...	14	23	860	57
Total Head 1 ...	4,000	143	54,576	3,203	1,55,653	19,397

From the above figures it appears that a British Cavalry Unit is about $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as much more costly as any Indian Cavalry Unit. In the same way, a British Unit is proportionately still more costly as compared to any Indian Infantry Unit. There is another interesting point to note and that is, whereas, the Unit-cost of an Indian Infantry Unit is less than that of an average Indian Cavalry Unit, the cost of a British Infantry Unit is not only less than, but is somewhat more than any British Cavalry Unit.

The British Force serving in India is a part and parcel of the British Army serving in Great Britain. It would be interesting to compare the Unit-Cost of British Units in England, with those serving in India (British Units). For instance, the annual Effective cost of an Infantry Unit in Great Britain is £117,660, while that of a Cavalry Unit in the same country is £108,700. In Indian Currency these figures come, roughly, to about Rs. 15·58 lakhs for the Infantry and Rs. 14·49 lakhs for the Cavalry. We have just now referred to the cost of British Units serving in India, both Cavalry as well as Infantry, and hence we find that, whereas, a British Infantry Unit in Great Britain costs about Rs. 15·68 lakhs per year, the same Unit, on reaching India from Great Britain, begins to spend something like Rs. 17·26 lakhs, or an annual increase of about **TWO LAKHS** of rupees per Unit of Infantry of the British Army. The same, more or less, is the case with the British Cavalry Units, which in Great Britain requires about Rs. 14·49 lakhs, while in India requires about Rs. **TWO LAKHS** more.

The word Unit referred to here very commonly, is liable to create a sort of misunderstanding. A

Cavalry Unit means a Cavalry Regiment, while an Infantry Unit means an Infantry Battalion. We have already dealt with the organisation and constitution of Infantry Battalions, as well as Cavalry Regiments. The total strength of an Infantry Battalion, would thus come to about 991 Officers and men. It is curious, however, to find that these numbers fall short of the existing strength of British Units serving in India. Let us take, for instance, the British Units serving in India. It is interesting to go into the details of the composition of an infantry Battalion, in England. An infantry Battalion, there comprises of 28 King's Commissioned Officers, 8 Warrant Officers, 30 Sergeants, 16 Trumpeters and Drummers, and 700 other Ranks, or a total of 791 Officers and men; while a Cavalry Regiment in England comprises of 24 King's Commissioned Officers, 10 Warrant Officers, 31 Sergeants, 6 Trumpeters and Drummers, and 502 Other Ranks, or a total of 574 Officers and men.

Now when these Infantry and Cavalry Units leave England, their numbers are enhanced to a considerable extent, both as regards the Officers' personnel, as well as that of the rank and file. The strength of a British Infantry Battalion, either in the Colonies or in Egypt is as follows:— 28 King's Commissioned Officers, 8 Warrant Officers, 30 Sergeants, 16 Trumpeters and Drummers, and 799 Other Ranks, or a total of 881 Officers and men. This shows that there is an increase of about 90 men per Every British Battalion, over its HOME strength. In India, however, the position appears to be still more complexing. A British Infantry Battalion serving in India, comprises of 28 King's Commissioned Officers, and 882 Other Ranks, or a total

of about 910 Officers and men. A Cavalry Unit on the other hand, in India, comprises of 27 King's Commissioned Officers and 571 Other Ranks, or a total of only 599 Officers and men.

We have alluded to the above two illustrations to show how the composition of a typical Unit of an Army changes according to the country in which it has to serve. In India, particularly, an increase of about 80 men per Regiment of Cavalry, and an increase of about 200 men per Battalion of Infantry, means obviously a very large extra expenditure for the Indian Treasury, both under the Effective as well as under the Non-Effective Charges.

It may be argued that this increase in the personnel of the different categories of the British Army, is bound to be there, or is even inevitable, due to peculiar circumstances. The British War Office, maintains that this augmentation is absolutely essential in view of internal security of the country, the country's political relations with the neighbouring countries, etc.

India has to pay a per capita charge annually to the British Treasury, (War Office) for every British soldier serving in India, and who at the same time forms a part and parcel of the British Army in England. This charge, as has already been pointed out, is known as the Capitation Charge. It is needless to say, or even to repeat the reasons for which this charge is imposed. But according to the agreement India can demand any number of drafts from England without any special monetary charge; for according to the Short Service system, every Regiment

or Unit serving in India, has its own counterpart in England in the shape of a linked Battalion, which is also regarded as a depot for the Units serving outside England. These Units at foreign stations, therefore, have a natural right to order their respective counterparts, to send as many drafts as may be required, or are found necessary. Under these circumstances, therefore, it is quite unnecessary to maintain an augmented strength of the British Units in India. The British War Office is a decided gainer under this arrangement, and as such, there is hardly any difficulty in the way.

In every country the organisation and the composition of the various Arms of the Fighting Forces is not the same during the War-time as it is in the Peace-time. There is what is called a Peace Establishment. In normal times, the Army is constituted, organised and equipped on a peace-footing, which on mobilization, is changed into a War Establishment. This change from peace to war, naturally requires a sort of margin between the two, and this is exactly why the peace establishment is higher than the War-establishment. The same is the case with England, as far as the British Army is concerned, and also in India as far as the Indian Army is concerned. Strange to say, however, the British Force in India, is neither wholly on a Peace-footing nor on a wholly War-footing. As long as a Unit is in England, it is taken to be on a War-footing, but on the eve of its departure, either to the Colonies, or to Egypt, or to India, it is turned into an enhanced establishment, and its strength is fully equipped and augmented.

In India, therefore, whereas, the Indian Army is on a war-footing, the British Army is on a Peace-footing, and as such more money is required and this too at an ever-increasing rate, which unnecessarily levies a burden on the Indian tax-payer. The first step, therefore, would be to bring about an agreement with the War Office, in England, whereby the British Forces serving in India would be reduced to the normal, or which is the same as the Home strength. A reduction of about 200 men per Battalion of British Infantry, in India, would mean a saving of about 9,000 men of all ranks, in the British Infantry Units alone, in India. There would be a corresponding reduction, in the expenditure on the Arms and Services, of the Fighting Forces in India, such as the Cavalry, the Engineer Services etc. The saving thus effected would be not less than about *FIVE CRORES* of rupees.

The Defence Sub-Committee, of the First Round Table Conference unanimously passed a Resolution, which shows the trend of thought of Indian Leaders of all shades of opinion, in general. The Resolution is as follows:—

“This Committee also recognises the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British Troops in India, to the lowest possible figure, and consider that, the question should form the subject of expert investigation early.”

In the meanwhile, that is, before any such Committee investigates the possibilities of any reduction in the existing British Forces, in India, it is perfectly logical to claim that these various Arms should, at first, be reorganised and maintained on the

same footing as in England, and that the injustice under which India is made to suffer for the last so many years should be removed at the earliest possible moment. We are fully aware that this question is very vital to the British War Office, but we may equally venture to say that the same is the case with India too! In the name of justice, and fairplay, we earnestly hope that this long-suffering injustice would be set right without the least possible delay.

CHAPTER X

THE PROBLEM OF RETRENCHMENT.

"Despite the lessons of the Great War, Despite the League of Nations, and the undoubted growing feeling throughout the world, that disputes between Nations and Nations should be settled by arbitration, no sensible man suggests that War is outside the range of possibility. Until Wars, and rumours of War die away completely, from this earth, India must guard her Frontiers efficiently and effectively". Thus writes a leading organ of the vested interests, on the 7th September 1932, while discussing the subject of *Federation and Defence*. So also Sir Godfrey Fell, the then Army Member, in his Budget speech in the Legislative Assembly, on the 7th. March 1921, observed, "The first duty of any civilised Government is *National Defence*. National Defence depends upon the existence of an Army, an efficient and capable Army, sufficient to meet the obligations which it is called upon to perform. These obligations vary from country to country."*

The *FIELD SERVICE REGULATION*, a standard Manual for the Army, says, "*War is the ultimate resource of policy, and every nation must be ready, in the last instance, to protect its vital interests by force of arms, unless it is prepared to surrender to an enemy without a blow.*"

* *Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. II, p. 737.*

The problem of Defence in India is both important and difficult; important because, India as a nation, must bear her natural burden of guarding her own interests; and difficult because under the present circumstances—in the opinion of responsible persons in India, the present cost of Defence is much more than what she can conveniently bear. This problem of cutting down the expenditure on Defence has been the subject of many Committees and Commissions, the latest being the Central Retrenchment Advisory Committee. Before any discussion regarding the problem of retrenchment in the Military Estimates of the Government of India, it is worth while to see what the Defence needs of the Government are, or to be more exact, what the Indian Army is meant for.

Whatever the functions of the Indian Army may have been in the past, the Indian Army since 1920, according to the Easher Committee, is divided into three groups, "The purposes for which the Indian Army must be maintained may be stated to be, (1) Preventing or Repelling attacks or threatened aggressions, from foreign enemies beyond our border; (2) Making successful armed disturbance or rebellion within British India or its Feudatory States, impossible; (3) Watching and overawing the Armies of the Native States."

Writing about the functions of the Indian Army, the late Lord Curzon said,* "The Indian Army, in fact, has always possessed and has been found possessing a triple function, the preservation of Internal peace; (2) The Defence of Indian Frontiers; (3) Preparedness

* "*The Indian Corps in France*" Lord Curzon, p. VIII.

to embark, at a moment's notice for Imperial Service in other parts of the globe."

Even today, there is very little change in the policy for maintaining the Army in India. As late as 1920, the Easher Committee observed, "The purpose of the Army in India is a dual one; (1) External aggression; (2) Internal Security; each of these two main heads may, conveniently be sub-divided into two sub-heads; External Aggression: (a) Frontier Defence; (b) Foreign Service; Internal Security: (a) In aid of Civil power; (b) In aid of the Indian Princes according to Treaty Obligations."

The same Easher Committee further added,* "The Military conditions and requirements of India are not analogous to those either of the United Kingdom, or of an Expeditionary Force. In India, the areas of Commands and Districts are infinitely greater, and communications are also less rapid. External conditions demand a state of preparedness for war, while internal uncertainty or unrest may, at any time, require immediate action."

It has already been pointed out how the British Force in India came to be steadily increased since about the last decade of the nineteenth century. The one reason given by the Government for this increase was the fear about Russia. The Tuloch Committee, for instance, in its report says,† "The increase of the British Army in India was rendered necessary, and arose from wars and policy, enforced by the British Government with a view to English interests. The

* *Report, Easher Committee, 1920. Part III, Para 168.*

† *Observations of the India Office Members on the Tuloch Committee 1860—61.*

increase is to be traced to the Afghan Wars". It is no wonder, therefore, that, "The question as to the exact number of the British Force required in India depends upon the probability of either internal disturbances or external aggression".

Sir David Waterfield, in reply to a question said,* "On any such questions as the reduction of Military Establishments in India it is necessary to consult the Secretary of State for India, who in turn must consult the War Office, to see whether any reduction of the British Forces in India could be effected". Sir Alfred Lyall remarked,† "Her (India's) external policy and Military Establishments must necessarily be regulated upon European rather than upon Indian or Asiatic considerations".

The late Honourable G. K. Gokhale, in his Budget speech, in 1903 observed, "General Brackenbury, sometimes Military Member, of the Governor-General's Executive Council, admitted in his evidence before the Welby Commission, that the present strength of the British Army was in excess of India's requirements, and that, a portion of it was maintained in India for Imperial purposes".

It will be apparent from the above quotations, that the chief role of the Army in India is to be in readiness in case of any sudden call to arms, whether in the interests of India or the Empire. During the last century, Indian Troops have taken part in almost all campaigns that Great Britain had to encounter. It is worthy of note, that in not a single case has the

* *Ayerton Committee Report, Reply to question No. 332.*

† *British Dominion in India—Sir Alfred Lyall, p. 342.*

Imperial Government made full payment to India for the Services rendered by the Indian Troops. This has naturally created suspicion in the minds of Indians in general, about the uses of the Indian Army.

The late Right Honourable Mr. Ramsay MacDonald said* "A large part of the Army in India—certainly a half—is an Imperial Army which we require for purely Imperial purposes, (other than Indian) and its cost, therefore, should be met from Imperial and not from Indian funds".

This past experience ultimately led Sir P. S. Shivaswami Aiyar to table a resolution on this subject, in the first Session of the Reformed Legislature of India, which ran as follows, "The purposes of the Army in India must be held to be Defence against external aggression and the maintenance of internal peace and tranquillity, and to the extent to which it is necessary for India to maintain an Army for these purposes, its organisation, equipment, and administration should be thoroughly up-to-date, and with due regard to Indian conditions, in accordance with present-day standards of efficiency in the British Army, so that when the Army in India has to co-operate with the British Army on any occasion there may be no dissimilarities of organisation etc. which would render such co-operation difficult. For any purposes other than those mentioned in the first sentence, the obligations resting on India should be no more onerous than those resting on the Self-Governing Dominions, and should be undertaken, subject to the same conditions as are applicable to those Dominions".

* *Public Finance and our Poverty*—J. C. Kumarappa. P. 32.

The above resolution shows that public opinion is becoming more and more vocal on the question of the Indian Army being utilised for Imperial interests, and this too, mainly at India's expense. It is interesting to note that, in the Self-Governing Dominions, the Imperial Army is not only maintained at the cost of Great Britain, but the British Government also grants lump sums of money to some, at least, of these Self-Governing Dominions including some Colonies too, for Defence measures, *in the interest of the Empire*.

Coming to the question of Frontier Defence, it is first essential to know the importance of the North Western Frontier Province, since it is the most vulnerable of all the Indian Provinces. History tells us that invaders in the past have always invariably invaded India by this route, and hence the importance of this part of India, and simultaneously its Defence, becomes all the more vital. A passage* from the speech of Lord Rawlinson, former Commander-in-Chief of India, is quite enough to bring the foregoing facts to prominence, "The history of the North-West Frontier for the last forty years or so, has been one continuous series of expeditions, and unless we can induce the North-West Frontier Tribes to migrate, wholesale, to some continent other than Asia, I see little prospect of a peaceful North-West Frontier, except on the basis of a close and friendly agreement with the Army of Afghanistan".

It is unnecessary here to give a history of the relations between the Government of India and the

* *Legislative Assembly Debates, 1921, p. 743.*

Afghan people. These relations date back to the First Afghan War, which was the direct outcome of the erroneous foreign policy of the then Government of India. Any way, the fact remains that, however the Government of India may try to manage friendly relations with Afghanistan, it is very unlikely that the Afghans would allow themselves to be the Cat's Paw of Great Britain, through the direct supervision of the Government in this country.

The control of the Frontier Tribes is a question even more difficult than the Afghan question. A neutral zone exists between the boundaries of India and Afghanistan, and the inhabitants of this tribal territory live a corporate life, which is at times known as Tribal Life. These Tribes, being nomadic, are very unruly, and they undertake small raids on the adjoining territories in British India. Naturally, one of the duties of the Government of India is to hold these Tribes in check, and thus maintain security of life and property of the British subjects, living in these parts of India. Moreover these Tribes are Mahomedan mostly or wholly, and as such they are liable to be influenced by the happenings in the Mahomedan countries of the world. It is because of this dual aspect of the Frontier Question that a controversy arose within the Government of India itself, as to which policy would be most conducive to the best interests of India. One School advocated the total abolition of the Neutral Zone between the two countries, thus making the Border-Tribes directly subordinate to the Government of India. The other School, advocated the policy of *TIP & RUN*, that is, instead of the wholesale abolition of the Neutral Zone, a slow

and steady advance into that zone, secure strategic points, and thus make it impossible for the Tribes to rise against the Government of India. This controversy between the exponents of the two opposite ideas or Schools continued for some time, but soon a solution was found by the then Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, in a policy which has been well-described as a medium between the two. Under this new scheme, the Tribesmen were made to protect their own country, as well as the Indian Border, while Regular Troops were withdrawn from their advanced positions, and were replaced by the Tribal Militia.

It has always been the policy of the Indian Government to regard Afghanistan as a Buffer State between India and Russia. This may be one of the reasons why the Sandemanites carried much weight during the last two decades or so. Lord Curzon's determination of following the middle course, between the Offensive and the Defensive ideals or Schools, meant that there was no impending change in the relations between the two countries concerned. The third Afghan War of 1919, and the subsequent events in that country, including the capitulation of ex-King Amanullah, as also the rise of one of his Generals, to the Afghan throne, must have revolutionised the Frontier Policy of the Indian Government. Sir Alfred Lyall says, "It has always been the policy of the British in India, as of other civilised empires in other countries of the world, in contrast with barbarians to maintain a zone of Tribal lands and chiefships, as a barrier or quick-set hedge, against trespassers upon their actual Frontier, by taking these Chiefships and other principalities, under their protec-

tion".* As long as the Afghans allowed themselves to be under the general guidance and supervision of the Government of India, there was general unanimity among officials in India on the question of making the Indian and the Afghan Frontier touch each other. But on account of the gradual change in the Afghan affairs, it was essential to maintain the Tribal Zone on the Frontier, in an independent or semi-independent capacity, and make this a *BUFFER* between India and Afghanistan.

There is one more difficulty as regards this Frontier Question. The population of the Frontier Zone is predominantly Mahomedan. Both the sides of this Frontier Zone are populated by Mahomedans. In India there are something like 70 millions of Mahomedans, and even though they are a minority community, any trouble on the Frontier or beyond it, arouses unnecessary anxiety in their minds. A glaring instance of this Tribal Mahomedan mentality is the Khilafat agitation of 1921-22.

As the Commander-in-Chief in India observed in one of his Budget speeches in 1921, in the Legislative Assembly, "Small wars or punitive expeditions, etc., are continually going on, on the Frontier, for the last sixty years or over". It has been said, times without number, and by all Englishmen, whether official or non-official, whether again, in the civil or in the Military employ, that the conditions of Warfare on India's Frontier, demand the presence of British Troops in India. They further add that the Frontier Wars have been fought by British Troops alone, and hence

**British Dominion in India*—Sir Alfred Lyall P. 307.

without them, there would be no security on the Indian Frontier. They also imply that Indian soldiers would not be able to defend the Indian Frontier or even fight a war, because the Indian soldier in general, is quite unused to such a form of warfare. The man in the street may, at times believe such a thing, either being impressed by the Englishman's argument, or because of the habit of obedience towards any Civil or Military authority. Many times, this belief is also due to complete ignorance of vital facts. A close examination of the various Units of the Indian Army, as well as the British Units, employed during the various Frontier Operations, or Expeditions, during the last seventy years or so, reveals the fact that in nearly all the encounters on the Frontier, there was an overwhelming majority of Indian soldiers. Instead of a mere sprinkling of Indian Soldiers among an ocean of British warriors, the truth comes out that the situation is just the opposite. A list of some of the more important expeditions and the number of Troops, both British and Indian, employed in these expeditions, would give the readers an idea of the hollowness of some of the arguments usually advanced.

† **Statement of the Approximate Percentage
of British and Indian Troops**

Number of Campaign, with particulars as to the year, probable name, etc.	Percentage of Troops to the total	
	Indian	British
1. 1851-52. Mohamands	84	16
2. 1852. Renizasis and Utmankhels		
3. 1852. Vaziris		

† *Statement taken from Indian Defence Problem, By Capt. G. V. Modak, pp. 190-191.*

Number of Campaign, with particulars as to the year, probable name, etc.	Percentage of Troops to the total	
	Indian	British
4. 1853. Shiranis	85	15
5. 1855. Orkazais		
6. 1858. Mrkzais, Kurram, etc.	88	12
7. 1853—57. Deraghazikhan		
8. 1860. Vaziris	90	10
9. 1860. Vaziris	92	8
10. 1868. Black Mountain Expedition	94	6
11. 1868. Orkazais	95	5
12. 1872. Dawar		
13. 1877-78. Jowaki Expedition	96	4
14. 1880.		
15. 1881. Mahsuds	98	2
16. 1890-91. Thob Valley Expedition		
17. 1891. Miranzai I Expedition	100	nil
18. 1891. Miranzai II Expedition		
19. 1894—95. Mahsud Expedition		

British Troops in India gain training and experience in Frontier Warfares, which is invaluable because the North Western Frontier Province of India is the only training ground available for the Empire Troops to be trained in Frontier Expeditions. Therefore, England, should pay India for affording British Troops such a valuable training ground, over and above their actual and possible expenses including the pension.

The Defence of the Indian Frontier has been efficiently carried out for so many generations, and hence, there is no reason why this should not be continued, instead of handing over such work to uninterested and inexperienced hands. It is a well-known fact, that every British Soldier costs as much as three or four times an average Indian Soldier. In these days of sinking revenues, and troubled finances every plain and fair-minded person would prefer a cheap and an experienced Soldier to guard and defend the Indian Frontier, to a three or four times more costly and comparatively inexperienced British Soldier.

The question of Internal Security is so much exaggerated that one wonders what the underlying idea may be. High and responsible people have spoken, times without number, that the peace and tranquillity in India at the present time is due, wholly, to the presence of British Soldiers in this country. They even add that, if tomorrow, the British Personnel is withdrawn from this country, the Hindus and the Mussalmans, the two age-long warring communities would instantly run at each other's throats, and thus the peace and contentment enjoyed by the people for so many years, would vanish. It may be that there is truth or force in this argument, but all truths like this, are more often than not, mere half-truths. That without the presence of British Troops in this country, Hindus and Mussalmans would run at each other's throat, is a statement that requires corroboration. If such a statement is examined more closely, it will be clear that such an argument is a mere canard, just like the *Frontier Bogey!* To a question

put into the Legislative Assembly, by a Non-Official Member, the then Home Member of the Government of India furnished certain figures showing the number of occasions when Troops, both British and Indian, were actually called out on the spot; or even asked to be in readiness. From this statement one wonders whether those, who bring forth such lame arguments and half-truths, mean any serious business. Moreover, it is very difficult to be convinced that in any Communal trouble, the rioter would not mind any Indian Soldier holding a rifle in his hands, or that he would at once give up his riotous attitude, and even voluntarily surrender, or may even run away because of fear, the moment he saw a British Soldier with a rifle, in front of him.

The needs of India and the duties of the Indian Army have been considered so far. The reader will agree that, any retrenchment in the Military Expenditure of the Government of India, must proceed with the reduction of the British Personnel in India. The various arguments brought forth from time to time, against a reduction of this Force, have been considered already. None, not even the Military Officials, would ever say, that the fighting quality or the fighting efficiency of the Indian Soldier compares unfavourably with his British compatriot. On the contrary, the bravery and other soldierly qualities of the Indian Soldiers, shown during the last World War, in the various battlefields, brought forth a meed of praise, from all, and India is naturally proud of such Indians.

Sir P. S. Shivaswami Aiyar, during the Budget Discussion in the Legislative Assembly, observed,

"There are only two or three ways in which you can escape the crushing burdens of the Military Department:—

- (1) By taking steps, gradually, to replace that section of the Army, which is intended to maintain Internal Security;
- (2) To gradually Indianise the whole of the Indian Army;
- (3) To appeal to the Imperial Government, for a contribution for our heavy Military Expenditure".

Of the three remedies above quoted, the first two are practically identical in nature. The division of the whole Indian Army, into Internal Security or otherwise, is only for practical considerations. Naturally, the Internal Security Forces, must not be regarded as something totally different from the rest of the Indian Army. It will be better, therefore, to consider the first of the two remedies suggested.

The cost of every British Soldier is three to four times as much as the cost of an average Indian Soldier. The needs of the Modern Army in India, to-day, are about 55,000 British Troops and about 130,000 Indian Troops. The above numbers are on the assumption, that the present strength of the Indian Army is the minimum that India requires. If the British Troops are replaced by Indian Troops, the needs of India would generally be satisfied, and at the same time, a colossal amount of money would be saved. Moreover, by placing the duty of defending the Frontier, and also of maintaining Internal Security, wholly upon the

Indians themselves, there is every hope that the irresponsible elements among the Indians, would be automatically silenced.

With regard to an appeal to the Imperial Government for a money contribution towards the high Military Expenditure of India, it is not considered very seriously even among the responsible elements of either the Government or the Non-Officials. Especially, in these days of world depression, and when every country is engrossed with her usual—and at times peculiar—cares of balancing the Budget, etc., it should be our *DUTY* to do our level best and help ourselves in reducing the burdens on the British Treasury as far as possible. It is not possible for any country, however, friendly or benevolent it may be towards India, to give, year after year, a money contribution for the maintenance of a large Army. It would be even advisable to reduce our present Armed Forces below the level of our actual requirements; for forming a part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, it would not be too much to expect help, either from Great Britain or from the other Self-Governing Dominions in cases of need and danger. Sir Godfrey Fell, former Military Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, said, "We are one Empire, and the first duty of the various parts of this Empire, is that any one of them should be prepared, in case of need, to go to the aid of another part, when that other part is attacked."

Now-a-days, it is said that in order to attain full Dominion Status, India must bear her full share of her Defence. India, as has been shown, is very anxious to take up her legitimate share of these burdens, but then this cannot be a condition to the grant of full

Dominion Status, to this country. Every Dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations, is dependent on Great Britain for her Defence to a very great extent. England has also pledged herself to help these Dominions against foreign aggression. So far there is no obligation of any sort, upon any of these Dominion Governments, either to contribute towards the maintenance of British Forces, or even to maintain their own Forces by limitation of numbers. According to this convention, therefore,—the unwritten law of the British Commonwealth—Great Britain undertakes the full responsibilities, of the Defence of her Dominions, without any monetary charge for such a service. India, if after a thorough and complete reorganisation of her Defence Services, thinks it necessary to ask for help from Great Britain, we think anybody would naturally be prepared to help her. There is every ground to expect this much at least, especially when, India did so much to help Great Britain in *MEN*, *MONEY*, and *MATERIAL*, during the World War.

So far we saw some of the salient features of the Defence Services, and their Estimates, with a particular reference to the Army Department. An attempt is made now to see whether the present expenditure on the Indian Army can be further reduced.

It is needless to repeat here the various attempts made by different Committees and Commissions, at different times to reduce the Army Budget. Public opinion in this country insists upon reducing this huge expenditure to a level generally maintained by other countries. As has already been said, it is very difficult to fix any definite percentage quota of the total

national expenditure as a limit for the Defence Services of any country.

Professor Arnold Toynbee, in his *SURVEY of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*, gives a list of countries, showing the percentage of expenditure on their Defence Services, to their Total Expenditure.

Number in the List.	Name of Country.	% of Defence Expenditure to the total.
1st	India	45.29
8th	Japan	26.57
9th	Italy	23.46
14th	France	19.75
25th	United States of America	16.09
30th	United Kingdom	14.75
37th	Germany	7.69

Taking all things into consideration, it would not be an underestimation if we say that India should spend something like 15 per cent of her total expenditure on Defence. At the same time, we have to bear in mind that this 15 per cent. includes expenditure on all the three heads of Defence, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Taking India's total expenditure at about Rs. 130 crores per year, we conclude that India should not spend more than Rs. 22 crores—or say roughly about Rs. 25 crores—annually on her Defence Services. Of these Rs. 25 crores, Rs. 10 crores would be available for the Army, Rs. 10 crores would be for the Navy, and the remaining Rs. 5 crores for the Air Force. The problem, therefore, would be how to


bring about a reduction on the Army expenditure in India from the present total of about Rs. 45 crores, to the projected expenditure of about Rs. 10 crores per annum.

This reduction of a colossal sum of about Rs. 35 crores, will naturally be spread over a period of at least 10 to 15 years. Our problem would be to give a bare outline to achieve this end. It is common knowledge, that the Imperial Government is now considering ways and means to reduce or to minimise the heavy burdens of the Military Expenditure. Only recently a beginning has been made by agreeing to a lump sum donation to India for the upkeep of the British Force. That the British Force stationed in this country is a real burden, was recognised by all and hence the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference in 1932, passed a Resolution expressing its opinion in favour of a gradual reduction in the British Personnel of the Army in India. This therefore, is the first point that strikes us.

If we cast a glance at the Unit Costs of the British and the Indian Units for the different Arms, we find that on the whole, the British Unit is about THREE times as much more costly as an equivalent Indian Unit. Taking for granted that the whole of the British Personnel is replaced by an Indian Personnel, at the existing rates of pay, etc., there would be an actual saving of about Rs. 8 crores and odd annually. Reduction of the present total strength of the Indian Army according to the exigencies of the times, may be expected to bring about a further reduction of a few more crores in the Military Expenditure. With the steady reorganisation of the Indian Army, in conjunc-

tion with complete Indianisation, it would not be too much to expect a reduction of the present level of expenditure to an appreciable limit. The reduction of the present fat salaries, and the equally fat allowances, paid to the Officers of the Indian Army, is also a very important question. A paltry cut of about 5 per cent. in the pay and allowances of Officers of the Army in India, getting more than Rs. 200 per month, brought about a reduction of about a couple of crores of rupees. This indicates the nature of savings that can be effected by a wholesale reduction in the pay and the allowances of officers of the Army in India.

In the separate chapter on some Defence Systems of Different Countries, we saw that that the introduction of Short Service System or Conscription, brings about a progressive reduction of the Military Expenditure of a country, side by side with a progressive increase in the efficiency of the Army. It is very difficult to say exactly or precisely what should be the way; but it is certainly easy to chalk out our line of action once the goal is fixed. The difficulties in achieving the goal are bound to be many, but they should not deter us from following our main line of work.



A

Adams, Professor, 66, 67, 71.

Aiyar, Sir P. S. S. 18, 47, 91, 102, 107, 108, 113.

All Parties Conference, (also see Nehru Report) 20.

America (see under United States).

Arbuthnot, Mr. 83.

Assembly, Legislative, 19, 27.

Australia, 60.

Australian Defence Organisation, 33.

B

Bovenschen, Mr. A. C. 27.

British Army, 13, 15, 50, 56, 61, 65.

British Troops (see under British Army).

Brownslow, Field-Marshal Sir Charles, 99, 112.

Buchanan, Mr. 55, 59.

Burns, Colonel, 80.

C

Canada, 60.

Canada, Defence Organisation of, 35.

Cardwell Reforms, 15, 41.

Central Retrenchment Advisory Committee (De-

fence Sub-Committee), 26, 27, 28.

Ceylon, 64.

Capitation Charges, 50, 52, 54, 55.

Chesney, Sir George, 93.

Chetwoode, Field-Marshal Sir Philip, 25.

Choudhari, Mr. 76.

Chirol, Sir Valentine, 111.

D

Dalton, Professor, 6, 9.

Dilke, Sir Charles, 44.

E

East India Company, 51, 52, 78, 96, 99, 120, 122.

Eden Committee, 16, 45, 46, 121, 122.

Effective, Non-Charges, (see under Non-Effective Charges).

Egypt, 64.

Ellenborough, Lord, 78.

Easher Committee, 17.

F

Fell, Sir Godfrey, 18.

France, Defence Organisation of, 37.

G

Gokhale, the late Hon. Mr. G. K. 1, 43, 90, 95.

Goltz, Von der, 89, 91.

Grande, Mr. Julian, 68, 69.

Great Britain, 12, 13, 48, 65,
67.

Great Britain, Defence
Organisation of, 30.

Germany, 71.

H

Health Insurance, 62.

Hong Kong, 64.

I

Inchcape Committee, 17,
18.

India, Defence Organisa-
tion of, 39.

India, Government of, 6,
14, 18, 25, 51, 56, 57, 58,
61, 62, 94, 127.

Indian Capitation Tribu-
nal, 55.

Indian Military College
Committee, 25, 116, 117,
119.

Indian States' Forces, 120,
123.

Ironside, Maj. Gen. Sir Ed-
mund, 43, 70, 92.

J

Johnson, Sir E. B. 83.

K

King-Hall, Sir, Stephen, 89.

L

Lyll, Sir Alfred, 12, 123.

M

Maude, Colonel, 72, 73.

Maritius, 64.

Mansfield, General, 79, 80.

Munroe, Sir Thomas, 98.

N

Non-effective Charges, 52.
57, 61, 64.

O

Ogawa, Mr. Gotaro, 74.

P

Peel Committee, 13, 19.

Pole, Major Graham, 99.

R

Rahim, Sir Abdur, 26.

Radcliffe, Lt. Col. C. Delme,
48, 49.

Roberts, Lord, 93.

Romer's Committee, 54.

Round Table Conference
(Defence Sub-Commit-
tee), 24, 94, 100, 106.

S

Sandhurst Committee (see
under Skeen Committee)

Sethna, Sir Pheroz, 94.

Simla Army Commission
(see under Eden Com-
mittee)

Skeen Committee, 19, 106,
108, 114, 115.

Skeen, Lt. Gen. Sir Andrew,
19.

Simon Commission, 21, 75,
97, 104, 110.

Short Service System, 40,
42, 46, 49, 68.

Strait Settlements, 64

Sykes, Sir Frederick, 3.

T

Tulloch Committee, 56.

U

United States, Defence
Organisation of, 38.


Unemployment Insurance,
62.

W

Warre, Lt. General, 82.

Welby Commission, 54, 56,
57, 60.

Wellesley, Lord, 124.



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